William Viramontes v. City of Chicago
840 F.3d 423
| 7th Cir. | 2016Background
- William Viramontes was convicted in Illinois state court of aggravated assault and resisting arrest after an incident at a street festival; the state judge found he "actively swung in the direction of a police officer and missed" and then resisted.
- Viramontes sued two officers and the City under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging excessive force; the jury returned a verdict for the officers and the district court denied Viramontes’s Rule 59 motion for a new trial.
- The district court, applying this circuit’s Gilbert framework to implement Heck v. Humphrey, instructed the civil jury to accept the state-court factual findings (the "Gilbert instruction") and read that instruction at the start of trial and as necessary during evidence.
- The district court excluded certain impeachment/contradiction evidence that would have directly disputed the state-court finding but did not permit impeachment aimed at attacking witness credibility based on inconsistent prior testimony only when the inconsistency would imply invalidity of the conviction.
- Defense counsel made improper closing statements: used Viramontes’s 2012 felony conviction for a propensity argument and praised officers as "stars," both contrary to pretrial rulings; objections were sustained and jurors were told counsels’ statements are not evidence.
- The Seventh Circuit affirmed: (1) the Gilbert instruction’s content, timing, and limited use were proper; (2) excluding the particular impeachment was harmless error; and (3) defense counsel’s closing misconduct did not warrant a new trial given prompt objections, curative instructions, and brevity of the remarks.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Validity/content of Gilbert instruction (Heck implementation) | The instruction unlawfully relied on state-court factual findings rather than the criminal complaint | Circuit precedent permits taking the earlier proceeding's factual findings as true to avoid Heck conflict | Held: Instruction content was proper under Gilbert and circuit law; it mirrored the state-court findings and did not misstate law |
| Timing/use of Gilbert instruction and evidentiary effect | Court should have waited to give the instruction only after Viramontes directly contradicted his conviction; preventing impeachment of officer for inconsistent testimony deprived him of defense | Court may give instruction at start and during trial; Heck bars only arguments that would imply conviction invalidity; impeachment for inconsistency is allowed but not if it seeks to negate the conviction | Held: Timing was proper (per Gilbert). Court erred in barring impeachment for inconsistency but error was harmless because prior testimony was consistent with state findings |
| Defense counsel misconduct in closing (propensity / bolstering) | Misconduct (propensity use of 2012 conviction; character bolstering) prejudiced trial and warrants new trial | Objections were sustained, court gave curative instructions, and remarks were brief — no prejudice | Held: Remarks were improper but not prejudicial; denial of new trial affirmed (deferential abuse-of-discretion review) |
Key Cases Cited
- Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1974) (a § 1983 claim is barred if success would necessarily imply invalidity of a conviction)
- Gilbert v. Cook, 512 F.3d 899 (7th Cir. 2008) (district courts should instruct juries to accept prior proceeding facts as true to implement Heck)
- Helman v. Duhaime, 742 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2014) (focus on factual basis, not formal complaint, when applying Heck)
- Empress Casino Joliet Corp. v. Balmoral Racing Club, Inc., 831 F.3d 815 (7th Cir. 2016) (de novo review of jury instructions implicating questions of law; district court has discretion over wording)
- Christmas v. City of Chicago, 682 F.3d 632 (7th Cir. 2012) (party seeking new trial for counsel misconduct must show prejudice)
- United States v. Burt, 495 F.3d 733 (7th Cir. 2007) (impeachment targets witness credibility and is distinct from proving truth of an inconsistent assertion)
