William Stephens v. Union Pacific Railroad Company
935 F.3d 852
9th Cir.2019Background
- Plaintiff William Stephens developed mesothelioma and sued Union Pacific (UP) in federal court (diversity), alleging secondary asbestos exposure from his father’s work at a UP roundhouse in Weiser, Idaho in the late 1940s–1950s.
- Stephens previously sued in Oregon; claims against UP were dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction and he later settled with other defendants.
- Stephens’s claimed exposure theory: his father was exposed to asbestos at UP, brought asbestos home on clothing, contaminating the household and causing Stephens’s disease.
- UP admitted it likely used asbestos-containing products systemwide and that major overhauls could release asbestos, but denied records showing steam engines or repairs occurred at the Weiser roundhouse.
- Stephens’s direct evidence of exposure was limited to his childhood testimony (he visited up to four times and saw insulation work) and two expert opinions; experts assumed frequent parental exposure but lacked factual support about the father’s actual exposure frequency.
- The district court granted summary judgment for UP; the Ninth Circuit affirmed, finding insufficient proof that UP-attributable exposure was a substantial factor in causing Stephens’s mesothelioma.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Stephens produced sufficient evidence of exposure to asbestos attributable to UP | Stephens: his childhood observations plus expert opinion show he was exposed via his father’s contaminated clothing and household contamination | UP: no records or admissible evidence that asbestos work or engine repairs occurred at the Weiser roundhouse with sufficient frequency or intensity | Held: Evidence of exposure was tenuous; even if close, summary judgment affirmed on causation grounds |
| Whether UP-caused exposure was a "substantial factor" in causing mesothelioma under Idaho law | Stephens: experts opined secondary exposure from father was a substantial contributing cause | UP: experts’ opinions rest on unsupported assumptions about the father’s regular exposure; insufficient to show sustained/intense exposure required by substantial-factor test | Held: Experts’ opinions insufficient because they relied on unsupported assumptions; plaintiff failed to show sustained/frequent/high-level exposure needed to create genuine factual dispute |
| Admissibility/weight of expert testimony based on assumptions | Stephens: experts reasonably relied on facts they were told and childhood recollections; Idaho precedent cautions against second-guessing experts’ chosen facts | UP: under Fed. R. Evid. 702/703, expert opinions must be based on sufficient facts/data in the record; speculation cannot create a triable issue | Held: Federal evidentiary standards control; expert opinions here lack foundation and cannot create a genuine issue of material fact |
| Proper causation standard in asbestos secondary-exposure cases under Idaho law | Stephens: substantial-factor standard permits liability where defendant was one of several contributing causes | UP: even under substantial-factor test, plaintiff must show substantial exposure, not fleeting or minimal contact | Held: Court applies substantial-factor test as limited by prior Ninth Circuit/Restatement authority—requires sufficiently sustained/frequent and intense exposure; plaintiff did not meet that standard |
Key Cases Cited
- McIndoe v. Huntington Ingalls Inc., 817 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2016) (substantial-factor test requires substantial/frequent and intense asbestos exposure to survive summary judgment)
- Menne v. Celotex Corp., 861 F.2d 1453 (10th Cir. 1988) (exposure is an essential element of asbestos causation)
- Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (U.S. 1986) (summary judgment standard and view of evidence in nonmoving party’s favor)
- Guidroz-Brault v. Missouri Pacific R.R. Co., 254 F.3d 825 (9th Cir. 2001) (expert testimony must be based on sufficient facts/data, not speculation)
- Earl v. Cryovac, A Div. of W.R. Grace Co., 772 P.2d 725 (Idaho Ct. App. 1989) (Idaho discussion on expert reliance on facts, cited by court but federal standards govern admission in diversity cases)