39 F.4th 562
9th Cir.2022Background
- In August 1993 Pamela Richards was murdered; William Richards discovered the body and was later arrested and tried repeatedly, convicted in 1997 after four trials (two hung juries, one mistrial). The conviction was vacated and Richards exonerated years later.
- Criminalist Daniel Gregonis checked out Pamela’s severed fingers and Richards’s clothing from SBSD evidence storage in September 1993, and videorecorded removing a visible tuft of 15 short blue fibers from under a broken fingernail that he matched to Richards’s blue work shirt.
- The blue fibers were not reported or visible in autopsy photographs or by the medical examiner who scraped the nails at autopsy; they first appear clearly in Gregonis’s removal video; Gregonis was the only person with custody of both items between logging and the removal.
- The prosecution also relied on bite-mark evidence at trial; that evidence was later repudiated, and Richards’s conviction was vacated by the California Supreme Court after legislative changes defining “false evidence.”
- Richards sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming Gregonis deliberately fabricated the blue-fiber evidence and asserting Monell claims against San Bernardino County; the district court granted summary judgment for defendants; the Ninth Circuit reverses as to the blue-fiber fabrication claim against Gregonis and remands Monell claims against the County, affirming other claims separately.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Gregonis deliberately fabricated/ planted the blue fibers | The fibers were absent at autopsy photos and in autopsy handling, later appear in Gregonis’s video; Gregonis had exclusive access — direct and circumstantial evidence of planting | No motive shown; alternative explanations for late discovery; fibers not shown to be cause of conviction | Reversed summary judgment; triable issue exists whether Gregonis planted fibers (fact question for jury) |
| Whether motive is a required element of a fabrication claim | Richards relies on direct evidence and need not prove motive; motive is not an element | Defendants argue lack of motive undermines fabrication claim | Motive is not required; it is circumstantial evidence but not an element (citing Caldwell/Devereaux) |
| Causation — whether planted fibers caused the conviction (causal standard) | Due-process injury from fabricated evidence does not require but-for causation; materiality (reasonable likelihood evidence affected the jury) suffices | Defendants: bite-mark evidence, not fibers, was the necessary cause of conviction | Court adopts a materiality standard (Brady- style) for causation in fabrication claims: plaintiff need show reasonable likelihood the fabricated evidence could have affected the jury; remand to reassess causation under this standard |
| Monell liability — whether County can be liable absent individual officer liability | County policies/customs (e.g., restricting coroner access, lacking Brady training) caused constitutional injury independent of individual officer rulings | District court said Monell requires a predicate constitutional violation by an officer | Reversed as to Monell: County can be liable; court remands Monell claims for consideration (individual officer exoneration does not necessarily defeat municipal liability) |
Key Cases Cited
- Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2001) (recognizing due‑process right not to be prosecuted based on government‑fabricated evidence)
- Caldwell v. City & County of San Francisco, 889 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2018) (motive is evidence but not an element in fabrication claims)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (U.S. 1986) (summary judgment standard — court must not weigh evidence)
- Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (U.S. 1995) (Brady materiality standard: reasonable probability the result would differ)
- United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (U.S. 1985) (suppression of evidence deprives defendant of fair trial if material)
- Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434 (U.S. 2014) (discussing alternative causation principles when but‑for causation is inadequate)
- Osborne v. Dist. Atty.’s Off. for Third Judicial Dist., 521 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2008) (Brady causation need not show defendant would probably prevail if evidence disclosed)
- Smalls v. Collins, 10 F.4th 117 (2d Cir. 2021) (applying materiality standard to fabrication claims)
- Patrick v. City of Chicago, 974 F.3d 824 (7th Cir. 2020) (fabricated evidence actionable if material to jury’s judgment)
- Fairley v. Luman, 281 F.3d 913 (9th Cir. 2002) (municipal liability may remain even if individual officers are exonerated)
- Mendiola‑Martinez v. Arpaio, 836 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 2016) (same principle regarding municipal liability)
- United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (U.S. 1976) (false testimony requiring new trial if any reasonable likelihood it affected jury)
- Pelenty v. City of Seal Beach, [citation="588 F. App'x 623"] (9th Cir. 2014) (reversing summary judgment where officers had access to source of allegedly planted evidence)