William Peden v. District Council 33 Local 696
662 F. App'x 183
3rd Cir.2016Background
- Peden, a pro se plaintiff whose counsel was later appointed, sued his union (District Council 33 Local 696) alleging violations of the ADA and Title VII after he was terminated by the City of Philadelphia for chronic absenteeism.
- The Union repeatedly intervened earlier in Peden’s employment to avoid termination and negotiated six months of medical leave in 2009; the leave expired and the City refused to extend it.
- Because Peden could not return to work and was ineligible for disability benefits, the Union president advised him to resign to preserve a one-year reinstatement right; Peden refused and was terminated.
- Peden filed an appeal to the Civil Service Commission; the Union did not attend the hearing because Peden did not request representation and apparently told the Commission he did not wish to proceed, resulting in dismissal for want of prosecution.
- At summary judgment, the District Court found no evidence that the Union’s conduct was motivated by disability or any Title VII protected characteristic and no evidence of protected activity for a retaliation claim; the Third Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| ADA discrimination: Did the Union’s failure to represent Peden constitute unlawful disability discrimination? | Peden contended the Union "turned its back" and failed to represent him because of his disability. | Union argued there was no evidence its conduct was motivated by disability; nonrepresentation was optional and depended on member request. | Affirmed: No evidence linking Union's conduct to disability; speculation insufficient. |
| Title VII discrimination: Did the Union discriminate on grounds of race, color, sex, religion, or national origin? | Peden alleged discrimination broadly. | Union denied any discrimination; record shows Peden himself denied race-based motives. | Affirmed: Peden presented no evidence of discrimination on protected characteristics. |
| Retaliation under ADA/Title VII: Did Peden engage in protected activity and suffer retaliatory adverse action? | Peden implied the Union’s actions were retaliatory. | Union pointed to lack of any protected activity by Peden in the record. | Affirmed: No evidence Peden engaged in protected activity; retaliation claim fails. |
| Hybrid claim / duty of fair representation: Must Peden prove breach of DFR plus discriminatory animus? | Peden proceeded under hybrid theory (DFR breach + discrimination). | Union and court treated the hybrid framework as applicable but resolved the case on discriminatory motive. | Court affirmed on lack of discriminatory motive; noted but did not decide whether DFR breach is independently required for ADA/Title VII claims against a union. |
Key Cases Cited
- State Auto Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Pro Design, P.C., 566 F.3d 86 (3d Cir.) (standard of review for summary judgment)
- Gaul v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 134 F.3d 576 (3d Cir.) (ADA requires adverse action "as a result of discrimination")
- Ramara, Inc. v. Westfield Ins. Co., 814 F.3d 660 (3d Cir.) (speculation insufficient to avoid summary judgment)
- Uhl v. Zalk Josephs Fabricators, Inc., 121 F.3d 1133 (7th Cir.) (facts, not perceptions, required to support discrimination claim)
- Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780 (3d Cir.) (Title VII requires protected status to be a factor in challenged action)
- Moore v. City of Phila., 461 F.3d 331 (3d Cir.) (elements of retaliation claim)
- Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561 (3d Cir.) (elements of retaliation claim)
- Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 777 F.2d 113 (3d Cir.) (hybrid § 301 / DFR framework)