William Lofton v. United States, 920 F.3d 572

Lofton was convicted in 2007 of being a felon in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)) and sentenced with a 15‑year ACCA enhancement to 327 months.
The presentence report listed five predicate convictions: unlawful delivery of cannabis, theft, two aggravated battery convictions, and aggravated criminal sexual abuse.
After Johnson v. United States invalidated the ACCA residual clause (and Welch made Johnson retroactive), Lofton filed a § 2255 petition arguing he no longer qualified as an armed career criminal.
The district court denied relief, concluding the aggravated batteries met the ACCA force clause and the drug conviction was a serious drug offense; it did not address the sexual‑abuse conviction.
This panel reviewed whether the sentencing court likely relied on the residual clause for the sexual‑abuse conviction, whether that conviction and the aggravated batteries qualify under the force clause, and whether the drug conviction qualified as a serious drug offense.
The court concluded the sexual‑abuse statute was facially overbroad for the force clause and the Illinois cannabis delivery conviction did not meet the ACCA’s serious‑drug definition (three‑year maximum), leaving Lofton with at most two ACCA predicates.

Issue	Lofton’s Argument	Government’s Argument	Held
Whether Lofton’s aggravated criminal sexual abuse conviction qualified as an ACCA violent felony	The statute is overbroad and does not require violent physical force, so it is not an ACCA predicate	The conviction could constitute a violent felony under ACCA	The sexual‑abuse statute is facially overbroad and does not satisfy the ACCA force clause; it is not a predicate
Whether the sentencing court relied on the residual clause for the sexual‑abuse conviction	The background law at sentencing makes it more likely the court relied on the residual clause	The court could have relied on the force clause or both clauses	The record and contemporaneous precedent make it more likely the residual clause was used; not harmless error
Whether Lofton’s Illinois unlawful delivery of cannabis was a "serious drug offense" under ACCA	The Illinois offense has a 3‑year maximum and thus is not a serious drug offense	The government initially argued it was, but conceded it was not	The drug conviction is not a serious drug offense (max 3 years), so it cannot serve as an ACCA predicate
Whether Lofton is entitled to relief despite procedural default	Procedural default should not bar relief because his sentence exceeds the lawful statutory maximum	The government argued procedural default bars review	An illegal sentence (exceeding statutory maximum) may be corrected on § 2255 despite default; relief granted and release ordered

Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (invalidating ACCA residual clause)
Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016) (making Johnson retroactive on collateral review)
Walker v. United States, 900 F.3d 1012 (8th Cir. 2018) (burden for successive § 2255 claimants to show residual clause led to enhancement)
Golinveaux v. United States, 915 F.3d 564 (8th Cir. 2019) (applying Walker at merits stage of initial § 2255)
United States v. Lofton, 557 F.3d 594 (8th Cir. 2009) (Lofton’s direct appeal decision)
United States v. Madrid, 805 F.3d 1204 (10th Cir. 2015) (statute criminalizing sexual conduct with a child lacks a force/consent element)
Sun Bear v. United States, 644 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2011) (illegal sentence exceeding statutory authority can be corrected on § 2255)
United States v. Geozos, 870 F.3d 890 (9th Cir. 2017) (ordering release where sentence exceeded lawful maximum)