602 F. App'x 335
7th Cir.2015Background
- William Lee, an Elkhart police officer with prior disciplinary incidents (2007–2010), was placed on administrative leave while the department investigated new misconduct allegations and ultimately was fired after a Board of Public Safety hearing in Feb. 2011.
- Lee sought FMLA leave asserting PTSD from involvement in two shootings and related stress; he submitted an FMLA physician’s certification completed by psychologist Dr. Richard Hubbard.
- Dr. Hubbard’s certification did not diagnose PTSD, stated Lee was no longer under his care, noted no continuous incapacity but listed possible episodic flare-ups, and relied on sessions that ended five weeks earlier.
- Lee later consulted Dr. Stephanie Wade, who diagnosed PTSD, but Lee did not submit that diagnosis or an FMLA form to the employer or present it at the termination hearing.
- The City never processed Lee’s FMLA application because HR did not forward the certification to the Board; the Board considered substantiated misconduct and prior discipline and terminated Lee.
- Lee sued under the FMLA for interference and alleged a § 1983 conspiracy by Chief Pflibsen and Dr. Hubbard to delay diagnosis; the district court granted summary judgment to defendants and the Seventh Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Lee was entitled to FMLA leave for a "serious health condition" | Lee: PTSD qualifies and Dr. Hubbard’s certification raised a factual issue about continuing treatment and episodic incapacity | City: Certification did not establish a serious health condition or inability to work; no adequate contemporaneous certification or notice of need | Court: No — certification did not show a serious health condition or ongoing treatment supporting FMLA leave |
| Whether the City interfered with FMLA rights by failing to act on the application | Lee: City’s inaction denied him FMLA benefits | City: Even if processed, evidence shows misconduct would have led to termination; no prejudice from any delay | Court: No actionable interference; Lee failed to show entitlement or any resulting harm |
| Whether Pflibsen and Dr. Hubbard conspired to delay PTSD diagnosis to defeat FMLA leave (§ 1983) | Lee: Officials conspired to prevent his FMLA approval by delaying/withholding diagnosis | Defendants: No evidence of conspiracy; medical reports don’t show intentional delay or falsification | Court: No — conspiracy claim fails because underlying FMLA violation is unsupported |
| Whether Lee preserved and disputed district court’s harm finding on appeal | Lee: Listed issue but submitted no argument on harm | Defendants: Lee waived the argument by failing to brief it | Court: Waived; independent merit: even if FMLA violation existed, no showing of harm or that FMLA leave would have prevented termination |
Key Cases Cited
- Makowski v. SmithAmundsen LLC, 662 F.3d 818 (7th Cir. 2011) (FMLA interference standard overview)
- Scruggs v. Carrier Corp., 688 F.3d 821 (7th Cir. 2012) (elements for FMLA interference claim)
- Pagel v. TIN Inc., 695 F.3d 622 (7th Cir. 2012) (employer may terminate for misconduct notwithstanding FMLA leave)
- Cracco v. Vitran Express, Inc., 559 F.3d 625 (7th Cir. 2009) (same: FMLA leave does not shield from misconduct-based discharge)
- Franzen v. Ellis Corp., 543 F.3d 420 (7th Cir. 2008) (no prejudice where paid administrative leave replaces FMLA leave)
- Ridings v. Riverside Med. Ctr., 537 F.3d 755 (7th Cir. 2008) (prejudice requirement in FMLA interference claims)
- Marcatante v. City of Chicago, 657 F.3d 433 (7th Cir. 2011) (argument waived if not briefed on appeal)
- Campania Mgmt. Co. v. Rooks, Pitts & Poust, 290 F.3d 843 (7th Cir. 2002) (same waiver principle)
- Cefalu v. Village of Elk Grove, 211 F.3d 416 (7th Cir. 2000) (conspiracy claim fails if underlying constitutional violation unsupported)
- Thore v. Howe, 466 F.3d 173 (1st Cir. 2006) (same principle applied to § 1983 conspiracy)
- Young v. County of Fulton, 160 F.3d 899 (2d Cir. 1998) (same principle applied to § 1983 conspiracy)
