William Lane McGarvey v. The State of Wyoming
325 P.3d 450
Wyo.2014Background
- McGarvey was accused of forcing TM to perform oral sex and to have intercourse after giving her a ride; he initially admitted forcing her during a police interview.
- He pleaded guilty to the oral-sex charge, then withdrew the plea, moved to suppress statements, and proceeded to jury trial; jury convicted him of forced oral sex but acquitted him of forced intercourse.
- Defense sought to admit evidence under Wyoming’s rape-shield statute (Wyo. Stat. § 6-2-312) that (a) TM had been seen with a man earlier that night with her pants down and (b) seminal DNA from TM could not be attributed to McGarvey, arguing relevance to consent/credibility and motive to lie.
- District court suppressed pre‑Miranda portions of McGarvey’s interview, denied the rape‑shield proffer as not arguably relevant, and excluded the contested evidence; the lab results showed limited/ambiguous sperm/non‑sperm fractions and did not identify a third donor.
- McGarvey claimed ineffective assistance on three grounds: (1) counsel misunderstood and mishandled the rape‑shield motion and DNA interpretation; (2) counsel failed to investigate potential intoxication impairing voluntariness of his interview; (3) counsel failed to object to an alleged prosecutorial misstatement in rebuttal closing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Counsel’s handling of rape‑shield motion & DNA interpretation | Counsel failed to learn statute and DNA meaning; proper presentation would have admitted evidence and led to acquittal | Counsel timely sought admission under §6‑2‑312, argued relevance to consent/credibility, and pursued investigations; ambiguity in lab report was clarified pretrial | Court: No ineffective assistance — counsel knew statute’s reach, the proffer sought evidence the statute bars, and DNA did not support third‑donor theory; no deficient performance shown |
| 2. Failure to investigate intoxication at interview | Counsel should have contacted witnesses (e.g., bartender) and presented intoxication evidence to suppress statements as involuntary | Counsel subpoenaed the bartender, had access to the interview recording, detectives observed no intoxication, and McGarvey’s activities suggested sobriety | Court: No ineffective assistance — record lacks support for involuntariness; speculation insufficient to show deficient performance or prejudice |
| 3. Failure to object to prosecutor’s rebuttal argument | Prosecutor misstated law by asserting McGarvey’s belief in consent “doesn’t matter” | Prosecutor’s remark was a comment on evidence (credibility/consistency) not an instruction on law; counsel reasonably declined to object | Court: No ineffective assistance — remark judged evidentiary, not legal misstatement; objection not required |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (standard for ineffective assistance of counsel)
- Stogner v. State, 792 P.2d 1358 (purpose and scope of Wyoming rape‑shield protections)
- Moore v. State, 309 P.3d 1242 (Wyom. 2013) (standard of review for mixed questions in ineffectiveness claims)
- Jenkins v. State, 262 P.3d 552 (Wyom. 2011) (presumption of adequate assistance; prejudice requirement)
- Dettloft v. State, 152 P.3d 376 (Wyom. 2007) (ineffectiveness framework)
- United States v. Owens, 882 F.2d 1493 (10th Cir.) (mixed question review discussion)
- Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (confession voluntariness and impeachment rules)
- United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (confession/involuntary statements and Miranda implications)
