William Kirkpatrick, Jr. v. Kevin Chappell
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 19792
| 9th Cir. | 2017Background
- In 1983 William Kirkpatrick was convicted of two murders in California and sentenced to death; over ensuing decades he repeatedly sought to represent himself and challenged counsel's performance.
- After state conviction and direct appeal, Kirkpatrick filed a state habeas petition raising numerous claims (ineffective assistance at penalty phase and many others). While that petition was pending, he submitted a handwritten document stating he did not wish to proceed and that his sentence "be carried out at this time."
- The California Supreme Court appointed a referee (Judge Graham) and a psychiatrist to assess whether the handwritten "Waiver Form" was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent; the referee concluded the record was insufficient to find the waiver valid because Kirkpatrick refused to cooperate fully.
- Despite the referee's report, the California Supreme Court summarily found the waiver valid, dismissed the state petition, and the claims were therefore not adjudicated on the merits in state court.
- The federal district court treated those claims as unexhausted because of the state-court waiver, applied AEDPA deference to the California Supreme Court's waiver finding, and dismissed the claims; the Ninth Circuit granted review of whether that dismissal was correct.
- The Ninth Circuit majority held (1) AEDPA deferential review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) applies only to state-court adjudications on the merits, not to a state-court determination that a petitioner waived the right to pursue claims; and (2) on de novo review the record does not show the State met its burden to prove Kirkpatrick’s waiver was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, so the district court erred in dismissing the claims as unexhausted.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether AEDPA §2254(d) deference applies to a state-court finding that a petitioner waived habeas claims | Kirkpatrick: waiver validity is not a merits adjudication; AEDPA deference does not apply; federal court should review waiver de novo | State: California Supreme Court’s finding of a valid waiver is entitled to AEDPA deference | Court: AEDPA deference applies only to adjudications on the merits; waiver validity is not a "claim" for relief, so review is de novo |
| Whether the record shows Kirkpatrick knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to proceed | Kirkpatrick: record fails to show he understood waiver consequences; evidence suggests he intended to pursue claims pro se, not abandon them | State: the waiver form plus referee/psychiatrist process and California Supreme Court order established voluntariness and competence | Court: on de novo review the State did not meet its burden; record lacks evidence (no on-the-record colloquy; contradictory statements; referee found insufficient proof) — waiver invalid |
| Whether failure to hold a colloquy or to question petitioner on the record invalidates the waiver | Kirkpatrick: absence of an on-the-record colloquy and no sworn statement leaves intent and understanding unproven | State: prior cases do not require a colloquy; courts have discretion and may rely on other investigation | Court: although not strictly categorical, established precedents show courts typically ascertain waiver via on-the-record questioning; here absence of such inquiry contributes to invalidity |
| Remedy and remand posture: what should occur if waiver invalid | Kirkpatrick: claims should be remanded for merits adjudication because they were never decided on the merits in state court | State: upholding waiver would leave claims unexhausted and dismissed | Court: vacated district court’s dismissal and remanded for de novo consideration of the merits of the claims |
Key Cases Cited
- Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 (1990) (waiver must be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent)
- Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993) (courts must ensure defendant understands significance and consequences of waiver)
- Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986) (two dimensions of waiver: voluntariness and awareness of consequences)
- Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977) (burden on state to prove intentional relinquishment of a known right)
- Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (state bears burden to prove validity of waiver)
- Demosthenes v. Baal, 495 U.S. 731 (1990) (applies knowing/voluntary/intelligent standard to withdrawal of state post-conviction petition)
- Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (certain contexts do not always require knowing-intelligent-volatile standard; cited regarding scope)
- Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005) (definition of a "claim" under AEDPA)
- Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (federal courts defer to state merits decisions; relevant to when AEDPA applies)
- Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449 (2009) (federal courts must consider whether state court adjudicated claim on merits)
