William Kemp v. Superintendent Huntingdon SCI, 21-3165

In Feb. 2012 Kemp shot Thomas Schmitt after a fight at Schmitt’s friend’s house; multiple witnesses testified Kemp fired when Schmitt was not threatening him.
At the hospital and during a residue test Kemp made statements, was Mirandized, then responded evasively to an officer’s question about whether he had shot anyone (e.g., “you think I did”) and later said he needed a lawyer.
At trial the prosecutor argued Kemp’s post‑Miranda refusal to answer was "consciousness of guilt;" defense counsel did not object and sought no curative instruction. The trial court gave instructions that arguably permitted consideration of Kemp’s decision not to talk for some purposes.
Kemp was convicted of third‑degree murder and related offenses; state courts affirmed and a PCRA amended petition omitted the Doyle‑silence claim.
On federal habeas review (28 U.S.C. § 2254) the District Court rejected some claims and found the Doyle‑silence claim procedurally defaulted; this Court granted a COA on the ineffective‑assistance claim for failure to object to prosecutor’s comments about post‑Miranda silence.
The Third Circuit held counsel’s omission was objectively unreasonable (Doyle violation) but that Kemp could not show prejudice given the strength of the state’s evidence and the brief/cumulative nature of the error, so the habeas claim fails.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to prosecutor’s references to Kemp’s post‑Miranda silence/request for counsel	Kemp: counsel unreasonably failed to object to Doyle violation and failed to seek adequate jury instructions/mistrial	State: although summation violated Doyle, the error was harmless—other strong evidence of guilt made any objection non‑prejudicial; procedural default also asserted	Court: Counsel was deficient (Doyle violation) but Kemp failed Strickland prejudice prong; no relief granted

Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976) (use of post‑Miranda silence violates due process because Miranda implies silence will carry no penalty)
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (Miranda warnings and custodial‑interrogation framework)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two‑prong ineffective assistance standard: performance and prejudice)
Boyer v. Patton, 579 F.2d 284 (3d Cir. 1978) (counsel deficient for failing to object to Doyle violation)
Hassine v. Zimmerman, 160 F.3d 941 (3d Cir. 1998) (Doyle violation where prosecutor commented on silence and no curative instruction was given)
Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993) (harmless‑error inquiry for constitutional errors; error may be harmless when cumulative and brief)
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (to show prejudice the likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not merely conceivable)
United States v. Lopez, 818 F.3d 125 (3d Cir. 2016) (Doyle error prejudicial where credibility was central and government repeatedly referenced post‑Miranda silence)