William Joseph Batts v. Titan Insurance Company
322 Mich. App. 278
| Mich. Ct. App. | 2017Background
- Plaintiff, a veteran, was injured when his scooter struck a car that ran a stop sign; the other vehicle was unidentified.
- Plaintiff received some treatment from the VA and other treatment from non-VA providers; he had no applicable private no-fault policy in his household, so his claim proceeded through the assigned claims plan, which assigned the claim to Titan.
- Titan refused to pay any PIP benefits, arguing the VA constituted primary health coverage (like an HMO) and that statutory coordination/set-off rules excused Titan’s liability for care received outside the VA.
- Plaintiff contended the VA is not an insurer for non-service-connected injuries and pointed to 38 U.S.C. § 1729, which permits the United States to seek reimbursement from third parties for VA-provided care related to motor-vehicle accidents.
- The trial court denied Titan’s summary-disposition motion (holding Titan liable insofar as VA could not provide the needed services); parties later entered a stipulated judgment; Titan appealed the denial. The Court of Appeals affirmed but remanded to enter summary disposition for plaintiff.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Applicability of MCL 500.3109a (coordination of benefits in coordinated/no-fault policies) | 3109a does not apply because Batts did not purchase a coordinated no-fault policy. | VA coverage functions like an HMO/primary health insurer under 3109a, so Titan not liable for care available from VA. | 3109a inapplicable: provision governs insureds who purchased coordinated no-fault policies; Batts did not. |
| MCL 500.3172(2) (assigned-claims coordination with other benefit sources) | VA eligibility is not a benefit source that relieves Titan because 38 U.S.C. § 1729 makes the United States a subrogated third-party creditor, not a primary insurer. | VA health-care eligibility is a benefit source; assigned-claims benefits should be reduced to the extent other sources cover the same loss. | State statute cannot be applied to defeat the federal reimbursement scheme; VA care does not operate as duplicative government benefits that eliminate Titan’s PIP obligation. |
| MCL 500.3109(1) (set-off for government benefits) | No duplicative government benefit exists because federal law gives the United States a right to recover from third parties for VA-provided care (so VA care is subject to reimbursement, not a duplicative government benefit). | Titan is entitled to a set-off for federal/VA benefits against PIP owed. | Titan is not entitled to a set-off for VA-provided care here; 38 U.S.C. § 1729 means the United States seeks reimbursement rather than providing duplicative free benefits. |
| Entitlement to summary disposition | Batts sought judgment as a matter of law because Titan’s defenses were unreasonable and federal law preempts Titan’s defenses. | Titan argued factual and legal bases excused payment; summary disposition for Titan was proper. | Court affirms denial of Titan’s motion but for the right reasons grants Batts summary disposition and remands for entry of judgment for plaintiff. |
Key Cases Cited
- Tousignant v. Allstate Ins. Co., 444 Mich. 301 (1993) (coordination rules apply when insured purchased coordinated no-fault/HMO coverage)
- Owens v. Auto Club Ins. Ass'n, 444 Mich. 314 (1993) (discusses coordination where insured was active military with alternative federal coverage)
- St. John Macomb-Oakland Hosp. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 318 Mich. App. 256 (2016) (no-fault insurer not liable for medical expenses that a coordinated health insurer must pay)
- O'Donnell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 404 Mich. 524 (1979) (legislative intent behind § 3109(1) set-off for government benefits)
- Whitman v. City of Burton, 493 Mich. 303 (2013) (statutory interpretation: clear language controls)
- Ter Beek v. City of Wyoming, 495 Mich. 1 (2014) (Supremacy Clause and preemption principles)
- Morgan v. Citizens Ins. Co. of America, 432 Mich. 640 (1989) (distinguishes cases where plaintiff was active military at time of accident)
