William Johnson v. Marirosa Lamas, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 3842

In 2005 off-duty police officer Terrence Flomo was shot in North Philadelphia; William Johnson and Mumin Slaughter were charged. At Johnson’s retrial (2009), eyewitnesses Brenda Bowens and Nora Williams identified Johnson as the passenger‑side shooter. Forensic testimony placed the fatal shot from the passenger side.
Slaughter (co-defendant) had given a written statement to police implicating Johnson; at trial Slaughter refused to testify and repudiated that statement. The court nonetheless allowed the prosecution to present Slaughter’s out‑of‑court statement to the jury and had it read aloud.
The jury convicted Johnson of third‑degree murder and criminal conspiracy; Johnson appealed, arguing Confrontation Clause and due process violations from admission of Slaughter’s statement and from calling Slaughter when he would invoke the Fifth Amendment.
Pennsylvania courts acknowledged the Confrontation Clause error but held it harmless; the state courts also rejected Johnson’s separate due process claim regarding the prosecutor calling a witness who claimed the Fifth Amendment.
Johnson sought federal habeas relief; the District Court denied it and this decision was affirmed by the Third Circuit, which applied AEDPA deference and the Brecht harmless‑error standard on collateral review.

Issue	Johnson’s Argument	Commonwealth’s Argument	Held
Admission of Slaughter’s out‑of‑court statement violated Sixth Amendment confrontation rights and prejudiced the verdict	Admission of the nontestifying co‑defendant’s inculpatory statement deprived Johnson of confrontation and was not harmless given impeachment of eyewitnesses	Error conceded but argued harmless because Slaughter’s statement was cumulative of two eyewitnesses and other evidence	Error occurred but was harmless; AEDPA deference applies and a fair‑minded jurist could find the admission cumulative and not substantially injurious to the verdict
Prosecutor called Slaughter knowing he would invoke the Fifth Amendment, violating due process	Prosecutor deliberately elicited Slaughter’s invocation to harm Johnson and create an unacceptable inference of guilt	State courts and prosecution argued there was no clearly established Supreme Court law creating an independent due process rule; factual uncertainty about prosecutor’s knowledge	Denied: no clearly established Supreme Court authority compelled relief; factual record uncertain about prosecutor’s knowledge, so no AEDPA‑based relief

Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993) (collateral‑review harmless‑error standard: petitioner must show a substantial and injurious effect)
Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187 (2015) (clarified interaction of Brecht and AEDPA; state‑court harmlessness receives AEDPA deference)
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) (on direct review, constitutional error must be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt)
Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986) (factors for assessing Confrontation Clause error including whether testimony was cumulative)
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (state‑court rulings are not unreasonable if fair‑minded jurists could disagree)
Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112 (2007) (relationship between Brecht and AEDPA standards)
Namet v. United States, 373 U.S. 179 (1963) (discussed prosecution questioning when witness invokes Fifth; Supreme Court’s treatment was not a holding establishing a due process rule applicable on habeas)
Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965) (discussed prejudice from invoking Fifth when the invocation allows inferences not subject to cross‑examination)
Adamson v. Cathel, 633 F.3d 248 (3d Cir. 2011) (Bruton‑type errors required reversal where accomplice statements were the primary evidence against defendant)
Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3 (2002) (state court need not cite Supreme Court cases so long as reasoning/result do not contradict them)