William Jenkins v. Karl Nell, 26 F.4th 1243

Jenkins, a white crane operator at the Georgia Ports Authority, was supervised by Nell, a Black supervisor.
Dec 2016: Jenkins’s spreader bar incident; Jenkins reported a "hard landing" but refused Nell’s request to remove that language from his statement after Nell concluded the footage did not show a hard landing.
Aug 2017: Dispute over weekend leave; Jenkins scheduled a trusted HR meeting the next day. The evening before, Nell summoned Jenkins, warned him about HR, and told Jenkins to go home and removed him from the schedule after a heated exchange.
HR investigated (without letting Jenkins present his side), placed Jenkins on leave, and terminated him for violating Rule A-6 (insubordination/gross disrespect of a supervisor). Jenkins appealed internally and then sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 alleging race discrimination.
Jenkins presented evidence of (a) other employees allegedly treated better (including Randy Jones), (b) testimony that Nell made racially charged remarks about white crane operators and called their gatherings "Klan meetings," and (c) that many white operators left the department after Nell’s tenure.
The district court granted summary judgment for Nell, finding Jenkins failed to identify proper comparators under McDonnell Douglas and failed to show pretext or create a "convincing mosaic" of discrimination. The Eleventh Circuit reversed as to the convincing mosaic claim and remanded.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Jenkins established a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas (similarly situated comparator)	Jenkins identified three black crane-operator comparators (Jones, Jackson, Saussy) who were treated better and thus met the comparator prong.	Nell argued the proposed comparators were not similarly situated in all material respects (different misconduct/circumstances), so Jenkins failed the fourth McDonnell Douglas element.	Court: Jenkins failed to prove a proper comparator; district court correctly found no prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas.
Whether Jenkins created a "convincing mosaic" of circumstantial evidence supporting intentional discrimination	Jenkins pointed to suspicious timing, Nell’s alleged racially biased comments, differential treatment (Jones incident and others), departures of many white operators, Nell’s relationship with HR, and shifting reasons for termination.	Nell disputed witnesses' credibility, challenged the comparator relevance, and proffered nondiscriminatory reason (insubordination) for termination.	Court: Viewing credibility disputes and circumstantial evidence in Jenkins’s favor, a reasonable jury could infer intentional discrimination; summary judgment was improper.

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (establishes burden-shifting framework for circumstantial discrimination)
Lewis v. City of Union City, 918 F.3d 1213 (en banc) (defines "similarly situated in all material respects" comparator standard)
Lewis v. City of Union City, 934 F.3d 1169 (clarifies convincing-mosaic and comparator analysis at summary judgment)
Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321 (describes convincing-mosaic standard for circumstantial evidence)
Ferrill v. Parker Group, Inc., 168 F.3d 468 (§ 1981 prohibits intentional race discrimination in employment contracts)
Rice-Lamar v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, 232 F.3d 836 (elements of § 1981 claim mirror Title VII disparate-treatment claims)
Strickland v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 692 F.3d 1151 (credibility disputes preclude summary judgment)
Ross v. Rhodes Furniture, Inc., 146 F.3d 1286 (same-type comments can be circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent)