William Hinesley, III v. Wendy Knight, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 16725

Background

Defendant William Hinesley III (bench trial) convicted in Indiana state court of child molestation based primarily on testimony of victim V.V. and foster son Billy; no conclusive physical/DNA evidence.
V.V. and Billy gave initial videotaped statements to Detective Downing implicating Hinesley, but both later made inconsistent statements (V.V. briefly recanted; Billy disclaimed memory and later pled guilty to a separate unlawful sexual relationship with V.V.).
Defense counsel purposely declined to object when the prosecution elicited the witnesses’ prior out‑of‑court statements (including playing Billy’s videotape) and did not object to two statements where witnesses vouched for V.V.’s credibility, as part of a strategy to emphasize inconsistencies.
The trial judge found V.V. credible and convicted Hinesley on one Class A felony count; two other counts were dismissed at close of the State’s case.
Hinesley pursued post‑conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance (failure to object to hearsay and vouching; cumulative ineffectiveness); state courts concluded counsel’s strategy was reasonable and denied relief; Indiana Supreme Court denied transfer.
Federal district court denied habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254; Seventh Circuit affirms, applying Strickland and AEDPA deference and finding no unreasonable application of federal law and that cumulative‑error claim was procedurally defaulted.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether counsel was ineffective for not objecting to admission of witnesses’ out‑of‑court statements (hearsay)	Vandivier’s silence allowed inadmissible substantive hearsay to go before the factfinder and prejudiced the outcome	Defense strategy: allow statements in to expose inconsistencies and impeach credibility; statements would be elicited anyway	Court: Counsel’s tactic was a reasonable strategic choice and the state court’s decision was not an unreasonable application of Strickland
Whether counsel was ineffective for not objecting to witness vouching for V.V.’s credibility	Vouching statements improperly bolstered V.V. and prejudiced Hinesley	Statements were isolated, not emphasized, and consistent with the investigation; allowing them fit counsel’s overall strategy	Court: Even assuming unprofessional, no prejudice — isolated remarks unlikely to affect a bench judge’s credibility determination
Whether cumulative errors deprived Hinesley of effective assistance	Combined errors (hearsay, vouching, other omissions) had a cumulative prejudicial effect	Appellate record did not fairly present a distinct cumulative‑error argument to the state supreme court; claim procedurally defaulted	Court: Procedural default bars federal review of cumulative‑error claim
Whether state courts unreasonably applied Strickland under AEDPA	Hinesley contends state courts misapplied Strickland and Richter standards	State courts applied Strickland, credited counsel’s reasonable strategy, and found no prejudice; AEDPA double deference applies	Court: No unreasonable application of clearly established federal law; habeas denied

Key Cases Cited

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (establishes two‑prong test for ineffective assistance of counsel)
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (standard for § 2254 review; distinction between contrary and unreasonable application)
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (defining "unreasonable application" and deference to state court decisions)
Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111 (discusses doubly deferential review of counsel‑performance claims)
Bell v. Cone, 543 U.S. 447 (per curiam) (clarifies application of Strickland in AEDPA context)