William Hecht v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, 710 F. App'x 794

Background

Plaintiff William Hecht (an Engle-progeny plaintiff) sued R.J. Reynolds alleging smoking caused his COPD and that defendants concealed risks; RJR defended on statute-of-limitations grounds.
Parties agreed claims were time-barred if they accrued before May 5, 1990; jury found claims untimely and verdict entered for RJR.
Central factual disputes concerned when Hecht knew or should have known (actual or constructive knowledge) that he had COPD and that smoking could have caused it.
District court instructed the jury that a medical diagnosis was not required to start the limitations period and explained constructive knowledge ("means to obtain knowledge ordinarily equivalent to knowledge").
Hecht argued the instruction (1) improperly commented on evidence by stating diagnosis not required, (2) mis-stated/encouraged speculation about constructive knowledge (invoking Nardone/Carter), and (3) lacked evidentiary support.
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed: the instruction accurately stated Florida law (as modified in Carter and Engle progeny cases), did not shift burden, and sufficient evidence supported submission of the defense to the jury.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether jury instruction saying diagnosis not required was improper/comment on evidence	Hecht: instruction impermissibly favored defense and contradicted Carter by suggesting diagnosis unnecessary to accrual	RJR: instruction accurately states Florida law that accrual is when disease "manifests" and diagnosis is not required	Court: Affirmed—instruction correctly stated law (Carter/Engle/Jewett) and was not improper comment
Whether instruction on constructive knowledge ("means to obtain knowledge = knowledge") was erroneous	Hecht: language resurrects disfavored Nardone rule, shifts burden, and invites speculation	RJR: instruction appropriately explained constructive knowledge, tied to a "reasonably careful person," and preserved defendant’s burden	Court: Affirmed—instruction appropriately reflected modified Nardone doctrine and did not shift burden
Whether instruction improperly omitted causation requirement from accrual standard	Hecht: instruction blurred line between knowing injury and knowing causal connection	RJR: instruction tied manifestation to "some evidence" of causal relationship per Carter and Fla. statute	Court: Affirmed—instruction incorporated causation standard (reasonable possibility/supplied some evidence) consistent with Carter and statute
Whether evidence was sufficient to submit statute-of-limitations defense to jury	Hecht: RJR offered only speculative evidence; no direct proof he knew or should have known by May 5, 1990	RJR: evidence (exertional dyspnea, Social Security disability application in 1987 citing breathing problems, medical records, family history, warnings) supported submission	Court: Affirmed—ample evidence supported jury finding that Hecht knew or should have known before May 5, 1990

Key Cases Cited

Bhogaita v. Altamonte Heights Condo. Ass'n, 765 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 2014) (standard of appellate review for jury instructions)
Carter v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 778 So. 2d 932 (Fla. 2000) (accrual for creeping diseases when manifestations supply some evidence of causal relationship)
Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc., 945 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 2006) (phase‑I findings in Engle progeny and principles governing individual actions)
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Jewett, 106 So. 3d 465 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (approving similar jury instruction that diagnosis not required; manifestation standard)
Frazier v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 89 So. 3d 937 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) (limitations accrual tied to observable manifestations permitting suit)
Powell v. Radkins, 506 F.2d 763 (5th Cir. 1975) (approving constructive-knowledge instruction: means of knowledge equivalent to knowledge)
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Silver Star Health and Rehab., 739 F.3d 579 (11th Cir. 2013) (reiterating standard for disturbing jury instructions on appeal)