William Hawkins v. Rodney Mitchell, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 11906

Background

Late-night 9-1-1 domestic call: Sarah Bumgarner told dispatch her keys were inside William Hawkins’s home after a verbal argument; she said she was not injured.
Officers Mitchell and Bowersock arrived; Mitchell knocked, prevented Hawkins from closing the door, and entered the home without a warrant; Hawkins disputed facts and said he was in bed.
Hawkins called an attorney while officers were inside; the attorney advised Hawkins he could tell officers to leave; Hawkins remained on the phone and refused to comply with officers’ commands.
Officers arrested Hawkins inside his home after grabbing his wrists; charges were filed then later dropped; Hawkins alleges injury and psychological harm from the arrest and force.
Procedural posture: district court granted summary judgment for defendants on several counts (illegal seizure, First Amendment retaliation, false imprisonment) and submitted excessive-force and willful-and-wanton battery claims to a jury, which returned defense verdicts; the Seventh Circuit reviews and reverses in part and remands.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Legality of warrantless in‑home arrest (Count I)	Hawkins: entry and in‑home arrest were warrantless and violated the Fourth Amendment; no exigency justified entry.	Officers: entry was justified to prevent injury and to investigate a domestic incident; once inside they had probable cause to arrest.	Court: Entry and in‑home arrest were unconstitutional as a matter of law—no exigency supported warrantless, nonconsensual home entry; officers liable on Count I.
False imprisonment / probable cause to arrest (Count VI)	Hawkins: officers lacked probable cause to arrest him for theft or disorderly conduct.	Officers: facts known (caller’s report, scene disorder, Hawkins’ conduct) supplied probable cause for theft or disorderly conduct.	Court: No probable cause for theft; disputed facts about yelling/commotion preclude summary judgment on disorderly conduct—issue for jury.
First Amendment retaliation for consulting counsel (Count III)	Hawkins: calling an attorney was protected speech and may have motivated the arrest.	Officers: allowing that right would hamper law enforcement; possibly argued obstruction.	Court: Calling an attorney is protected; whether the call motivated the arrest is a jury question—summary judgment improper.
Excessive force / willful & wanton battery and jury instruction (Counts II, IV, V)	Hawkins: district court’s summary rulings (that entry/arrest lawfulness not at issue) and defense closing arguments prejudiced the jury; instruction improperly insulated lawfulness of entry from jury consideration.	Officers: jury was properly instructed that lawfulness of entry/arrest was not at issue for force claims; attorneys’ remarks were consistent with law of the case.	Court: Instruction accurately stated law but defense closing misled jurors and created substantial prejudice; reversal and new trial on these claims required.

Key Cases Cited

Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (warrantless, nonconsensual in‑home arrests presumptively unreasonable)
Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (exigency exception for preventing imminent injury)
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (warrant requirement subject to few, well‑delineated exceptions)
Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849 (police‑created exigencies test; reasonableness standard)
Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (presumption against warrantless in‑home arrests for minor offenses)
United States v. Venters, 539 F.3d 801 (objective review of exigency determination)
California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (seizure occurs upon physical force or submission to show of authority)
Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366 (probable cause standard: reasonable ground for belief particularized to person)
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (probable cause is a practical, commonsense assessment)
Denius v. Dunlap, 209 F.3d 944 (right to consult counsel protected by First Amendment)