William H. Mansell v. Bridgestone Firestone North American Tire, LLC
417 S.W.3d 393
Tenn.2013Background
- In 2008, Mansell injured his right shoulder while employed by Bridgestone Firestone; doctors issued impairment ratings of 3% and 10%.
- The MIR process under Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-204(d)(5) was requested before trial; trial court quashed it, citing lack of waiver and lack of jurisdiction, and the case proceeded to trial without an MIR report.
- After trial, the court awarded benefits using the 10% rating from Dr. Landsberg, and found the MIR process unconstitutional as applied.
- On appeal, the Tennessee Supreme Court vacated and remanded to address the constitutional challenges, adding the Attorney General as a defendant.
- On remand, Mansell submitted to an MIR by Dr. Weisman (7%), and the trial court again questioned the MIR statute’s constitutionality.
- The Supreme Court held the MIR process constitutional, determined the 7% MIR rating should govern, and remanded to modify the award to 1.5 times the 7% rating.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Is the MIR statute constitutional as applied in court? | Mansell: separation of powers prohibits MIR; presumption impairs judicial function. | Bridgestone/State: MIR is constitutional and aids efficient adjudication; evidenced-based. | Constitutional; MIR does not impermissibly infringe judicial power. |
| Does the MIR presumption violate due process? | Presumption is irrebuttable in practice, denying meaningful opportunity to contest impairment. | Presumption is rebuttable by clear and convincing evidence; not a permanent irrebuttable presumption. | Presumption is rebuttable and does not violate due process. |
| May the trial court properly apply the MIR presumption to override conflicting evidence? | Trial court may overcome MIR rating with clear and convincing evidence. | Evidence must clearly and convincingly rebut the MIR presumption; weighing is limited. | Record did not show clear and convincing rebuttal; 7% rating stands. |
| Is the MIR process properly interpretable as applicable in court, not only DOL? | MIR applies only to DOL proceedings. | MIR applies wherever a dispute exists, including court; statutory language broad. | MIR applies in court; statutory interpretation favors broad applicability. |
Key Cases Cited
- Mallard v. State, 40 S.W.3d 473 (Tenn. 2001) (court may interpret statutes supplementally, avoiding encroachment on judicial power)
- Martin v. Lear Corp., 90 S.W.3d 626 (Tenn. 2002) (upholds restricted expert testimony in workers’ compensation context; choice of policy by legislature)
- Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Morgan, 263 S.W.3d 827 (Tenn. 2008) (statutory interpretation; framework for applying statutes to statutory schemes)
- Scott v. Nashville Bridge Co., 223 S.W.2d 844 (Tenn. 1920) (historic validation of workers’ compensation act; legislative authority)
