William Groves v. South Bend Community School Co, 21-3336

William Groves, a longtime South Bend Community School Corporation employee and former Adams High School athletic director, applied in 2017 for a new Corporation Director of Athletics position but was not hired.
Superintendent Kenneth Spells (Black) interviewed candidates and recommended Seabe Gavin (Black); Spells found Gavin’s interview convincing and Groves’s interview poor and concerning.
In 2019 the District eliminated the corporation post and created four hybrid Dean of Students/Athletics positions; Gavin received the Riley High School position after a strong interview while Groves interviewed poorly.
Groves sued under Title VII for reverse race discrimination (and amended to add a discrimination claim for the 2019 hires and a retaliation claim); the District moved for summary judgment.
The district court granted summary judgment for the School District, finding no evidence that race influenced either hiring decision and that Groves offered only speculation about policy deviations (background checks); Groves abandoned his retaliation claim at summary judgment.
Groves appealed; the Seventh Circuit reviewed for whether a reasonable jury could find race caused the adverse actions and affirmed summary judgment for the School District.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Groves showed pretext for nonselection as Corporation Director of Athletics	Groves: he was substantially more qualified and the District’s reasons are pretext for reverse discrimination	District: Gavin performed far better in interview; both met posted minimums; interview performance was a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason	Held: Affirmed. Groves failed to show pretext or causal link to race
Whether Groves showed pretext for nonselection to a 2019 Dean of Students/Athletics role	Groves: he was more qualified on paper and should have been chosen	District: Gavin’s stronger interview and additional experience made him the better candidate	Held: Affirmed. Interview scores and later experience defeat Groves’s claim
Whether the District’s alleged failure to run a background check on Gavin shows discriminatory pretext	Groves: District ignored its background-check policy, hiding Gavin’s felony convictions, showing deviation and pretext	District: Policy applied to external hires only; no evidence District routinely ran checks on internal candidates	Held: Affirmed. Groves offered only speculation and no evidentiary dispute about the policy’s scope
Whether Groves’s retaliation claim survived summary judgment	Groves: claimed retaliation after elimination of his athletic director post	District: claim was not pursued at summary judgment	Held: District court treated retaliation claim as abandoned; appellate court did not revive it

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (establishing burden-shifting framework for discriminatory discharge and hiring claims)
Joll v. Valparaiso Cmty. Sch., 953 F.3d 923 (7th Cir. 2020) (pretext requires evidence tying adverse action to protected trait; causation focus)
Ortiz v. Werner Enters., Inc., 834 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2016) (summary-judgment inquiry is whether evidence permits a reasonable factfinder to find discrimination)
Millbrook v. IBP, Inc., 280 F.3d 1169 (7th Cir. 2002) (plaintiff must be clearly better qualified to prevail on qualifications-only evidence)
Robertson v. Dep’t of Health Servs., 949 F.3d 371 (7th Cir. 2020) (applies Millbrook “clearly better qualified” standard)
Baines v. Walgreen Co., 863 F.3d 656 (7th Cir. 2017) (employer’s unusual deviation from standard procedures can be circumstantial evidence of discrimination)
Parker v. Brooks Life Sci., Inc., 39 F.4th 931 (7th Cir. 2022) (pretext shown by weaknesses, inconsistencies, or contradictions in employer’s explanation)
Marnocha v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 986 F.3d 711 (7th Cir. 2021) (discussing types of evidence that can support a pretext inference)