920 F.3d 1038
6th Cir.2019Background
- Four Lansing residences were searched under drug-search warrants; after searches police called city code inspectors who inspected and "red-tagged" the homes as uninhabitable, forcing occupants out. Criminal charges arising from the searches were later dismissed for the plaintiffs.
- Plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against individual police officers, code inspectors, and the City of Lansing alleging Fourth Amendment (invalid warrants, unreasonable search/destruction, invasion of privacy, warrantless administrative searches), due-process violations (pre‑ and post‑deprivation procedures tied to red tags), false arrest, and malicious prosecution.
- District court granted summary judgment for defendants on most claims, but left open certain due‑process notice claims; inspectors appealed qualified immunity and the Sixth Circuit partially reversed on narrow grounds and remanded; on remand district court again entered judgment for defendants and plaintiffs appealed.
- The Sixth Circuit reviewed probable‑cause for each warrant (mixed results: most warrants upheld; one warrant presented staleness concerns but officers received qualified immunity), found genuine disputes on excessive destruction and invasion‑of‑privacy theories but required individualized proof of officers’ personal conduct, and held inspectors may have conducted unconstitutional warrantless administrative searches and failed to provide adequate post‑deprivation notice to tenants.
- Court held (1) inspectors not entitled to summary judgment on Fourth Amendment warrantless‑search claims (genuine issues of consent and exigency); (2) inspectors are immune with respect to certain narrow notice‑content claims previously addressed on interlocutory appeal but not immune for arbitrary pre‑deprivation red‑tagging; (3) City potentially liable under Monell for failing to provide adequate post‑deprivation notice to displaced tenants; (4) police officers were entitled to summary judgment on many claims for lack of personal participation or because of qualified immunity; false arrest/malicious prosecution claims were barred by probable cause.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Validity of criminal search warrants | Warrants lacked probable cause or were stale | Affidavits and corroborating trash pulls/controlled buys established probable cause | Warrants generally upheld; one warrant had staleness concerns but officers entitled to qualified immunity |
| Destructive execution of warrants (Fourth Amendment) | Searches were unreasonably destructive and caused code violations leading to red tags | Some disarray is expected; plaintiffs must show which officers personally caused or acquiesced in damage | Genuine disputes on destructiveness survive summary judgment, but police officers obtained summary judgment because plaintiffs failed to show each officer's direct participation |
| Admitting code inspectors / invasion of privacy | Police exceeded scope of criminal warrants by admitting inspectors without administrative warrants | Inspectors were state actors and spot code hazards; plain‑view justified calling inspectors | Police had no automatic authority to admit inspectors for administrative searches; inspectors’ presence implicated Fourth Amendment but claim against named officers failed for lack of individualized evidence |
| Warrantless administrative searches by inspectors | Inspectors performed searches/entered without warrants or precompliance review | City ordinance allows inspectors to inspect and exigent circumstances justified entry | Inspectors are not entitled to summary judgment; absence of pre‑compliance review and routine use of inspectors raise factual issues about exigency and consent |
| Pre‑deprivation eviction (red‑tagging) | Inspectors arbitrarily red‑tagged homes without pre‑eviction hearing when no emergency existed | Inspectors acted on observed hazards and Flatford permits emergency evictions when justified | Genuine disputes about whether conditions objectively justified immediate eviction; inspectors not immune on pre‑deprivation claims |
| Post‑deprivation notice of appeal rights | Red‑tags did not notify displaced tenants of right/20‑day deadline to appeal; City policy made appeals obscure | Red‑tags listed inspector contact and information was available on city website; public posting suffices | For homeowners notice may be sufficient, but for evicted tenants notice was not reasonably calculated to apprise them; City may be liable under Monell; inspectors immune on certain narrow content claims previously resolved |
| False arrest / malicious prosecution | Arrests and prosecutions lacked probable cause | Probable cause existed based on search results; defendant officer not involved in prosecution decisions | Summary judgment for officers affirmed: probable cause existed and no evidence of participation in prosecution |
Key Cases Cited
- Flatford v. City of Monroe, 17 F.3d 162 (6th Cir. 1994) (qualified immunity for inspector depends on objective reasonableness of evacuation decision)
- Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238 (1979) (officers executing warrants have discretion in manner of search but are subject to Fourth Amendment reasonableness)
- Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978) (warrant searches focus on whether evidence likely to be found at particular place)
- Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (administrative inspections of homes generally require warrant or precompliance review)
- United States v. Frechette, 583 F.3d 374 (6th Cir. 2009) (staleness analysis: ongoing operations reduce staleness concerns)
- Bills v. Aseltine, 958 F.2d 697 (6th Cir. 1992) (police may not invite private third parties to participate in a search beyond warrant scope)
- United States v. Sanchez, 509 F.2d 886 (6th Cir. 1975) (a warrant for one purpose does not authorize others to search for unrelated items without separate probable cause)
- Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) (due‑process standard for adequacy of notice: reasonably calculated to apprise interested parties)
- City of West Covina v. Perkins, 525 U.S. 234 (1999) (post‑seizure notice—if public sources adequately inform owner, extra notice may not be required)
- Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (due process generally requires notice and hearing prior to eviction)