William Emmett Lecroy, Jr. v. United States
739 F.3d 1297
| 11th Cir. | 2014Background
- William Emmett LeCroy Jr. was convicted (2004, N.D. Ga.) of carjacking resulting in death and sentenced to death; this Court affirmed on direct appeal.
- Defense team obtained a psychiatric evaluation from Dr. Michael Hilton (mixed findings: childhood sexual abuse, diagnoses including antisocial/borderline traits, and a detailed, incriminating account of the offense).
- Defense developed a “teaching expert” strategy: present Dr. David Lisak as a general expert on effects of childhood sexual abuse without having him evaluate LeCroy, to avoid triggering reciprocal Rule 12.2 examinations by the Government.
- The Government sought a Rule 12.2 evaluation; LeCroy invoked the Fifth Amendment and refused to submit to a government exam; the court appointed a firewalled government expert (Dr. Julie Medlin) to review records.
- At sentencing the defense declined to call Dr. Hilton or Dr. Lisak (after reviewing Dr. Medlin’s report) and presented mitigation through social-worker testimony and family/friends; jury found aggravators outweighed mitigators and returned death.
- LeCroy’s §2255 petition claimed ineffective assistance: inadequate mental-health investigation/presentation, failure to object to a “risk” escape instruction on future dangerousness, and failure to request a reasonable-doubt balancing instruction; the district court denied relief and this Court AFFIRMS.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Ineffective assistance for failure to investigate/present mental-health mitigation (not meeting with/calling Dr. Hilton) | LeCroy: counsel should have met with Hilton and called him; Hilton’s testimony would have provided strong mitigation and changed outcome | Government/Defense: counsel reviewed Hilton’s written report, strategically avoided calling him because his report contained highly aggravating details (graphic crime account, diagnoses, future-danger testimony) that could inflame jury and undermine guilt-phase theory | Not ineffective. Counsel’s choice was a reasonable strategic judgment and not prejudicial; Hilton’s testimony likely would have been double-edged or aggravating. |
| 2. Ineffective assistance for failing to have Lisak evaluated or call Lisak as teaching expert | LeCroy: counsel abandoned the teaching-expert plan; without Lisak the defense failed to connect childhood abuse to the crime | Defense: evaluating Lisak or calling him would have triggered government evaluation/rebuttal (Dr. Medlin); after Medlin’s report counsel reasonably avoided an experts’ battle and relied on lay/other witnesses | Not ineffective. Strategic decision reasonable under Strickland; Medlin’s report could have been persuasive to a lay jury; no reasonable probability of different result. |
| 3. Ineffective assistance for closing-phase failures (failure to connect abuse to crime; miscommunication between counsel) | LeCroy: counsel failed to drive mitigation home and did not make the necessary expert linkage in argument | Defense: counsel did present mitigation, asked for mercy, and made reasonable tactical choices; performance met constitutional minimum | Not ineffective. Counsel’s closing argued abuse-based mitigation; Strickland requires competence, not perfection. |
| 4. Failure to object to jury instructions ("risk" of escape / reasonable-doubt standard for balancing) | LeCroy: instruction using "risk" rather than "likelihood" allowed consideration of fanciful possibility; counsel should have requested reasonable-doubt instruction for balancing | Defense: instruction did not misstate law; at trial no controlling authority required a reasonable-doubt balancing instruction; other aggravators amply supported death verdict | Not ineffective. "Risk" instruction permissible; failure to request reasonable-doubt balancing instruction was not deficient because no prevailing law then required it; no prejudice shown. |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-prong ineffective-assistance standard: performance and prejudice)
- Holloway v. United States, 526 U.S. 1 (1999) (§2119 intent requirement and jurisdictional element for carjacking resulting in death)
- Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (capital-factfinding by jury)
- Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (facts increasing penalty must be found beyond a reasonable doubt)
- Bobby v. Van Hook, 558 U.S. 4 (2009) (Strickland does not require counsel to dig deeper where investigation is reasonable)
- United States v. LeCroy, 441 F.3d 914 (11th Cir. 2006) (direct-appeal opinion affirming conviction and sentence)
- Reed v. Secretary, Florida Dep't of Corrections, 593 F.3d 1217 (11th Cir. 2010) (recognizing mental-health evidence can be double-edged)
- Devine v. United States, 520 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 2008) (standard of review for §2255 denials)