William Drummond v. Robinson Township, 9 F.4th 217

Greater Pittsburgh Gun Club operated for decades on a 265-acre tract in Robinson Township; William Drummond leased the property in 2017 intending to sell firearms and operate a shooting range that would allow center‑fire rifles.
Robinson Township amended its zoning for Interchange Business Districts (IBD), redefining “Sportsman’s Clubs” to (1) allow only rim‑fire rifle practice (no center‑fire rifles) and (2) require Sportsman’s Clubs to be nonprofit entities; Industrial and Special Conservation districts continued to allow shooting ranges.
Drummond filed a facial Second Amendment challenge and sought a preliminary injunction; the District Court initially dismissed, this Court remanded for proper Marzzarella two‑step analysis, the District Court again dismissed without discovery, and Drummond appealed.
Core legal question: whether the rim‑fire limitation and the nonprofit‑ownership requirement implicate the Second Amendment and, if so, whether they survive heightened scrutiny under Marzzarella.
The Third Circuit held the challenged rules lack deep historical roots so they implicate the Second Amendment, applied intermediate scrutiny, found the Township had not plausibly shown a close fit at the pleading stage, vacated the dismissal, and remanded for discovery and for the District Court to consider the preliminary injunction.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Do the rim‑fire and nonprofit‑ownership rules fall within the Second Amendment?	Drummond: rules burden customers’ ability to acquire and train with commonly used arms.	Township: initially declined to contest Step One or argued rules are permissible zoning distinctions.	Court: Yes—neither rule has deep historical grounding; they implicate the Second Amendment (Marzzarella Step One satisfied).
What level of scrutiny applies?	Drummond: took no firm position on level; argues rules must face heightened review.	Township & District Court: applied intermediate scrutiny.	Court: Intermediate scrutiny governs because the rules do not destroy the Amendment’s core (home defense).
Does the ordinance survive intermediate scrutiny (fit and means‑ends)?	Drummond: ordinance is an outlier, lacks evidentiary support, and less‑restrictive alternatives exist; thus it fails fit.	Township: ordinance advances health, safety, welfare; zoning deference and preamble justify fit.	Court: At pleading stage, Township failed to show a reasonable/close fit or that it rejected less‑burdensome alternatives; plausible failure of intermediate scrutiny—vacate dismissal and remand for evidence/discovery.
Remedies — preliminary injunction and reassignment request?	Drummond: requests preliminary injunction and reassignment of judge.	Township: opposes.	Court: Denied reassignment; remanded for District Court to consider the preliminary injunction promptly.

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (recognizes an individual right to possess and carry weapons for self‑defense and identifies historical tradition as the interpretive guide and that some regulations are permissible).
United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010) (adopts a two‑step framework for Second Amendment review: scope inquiry then heightened scrutiny).
Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding a ban on firing ranges implicated the right to train with commonly used arms and required searching review).
McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464 (2014) (requires governments to consider less‑burdensome alternatives and warns against upholding outlier regulations without a close fit).
Bruni v. City of Pittsburgh, 824 F.3d 353 (3d Cir. 2016) (discusses allocation of burdens in intermediate scrutiny and deference in zoning contexts).
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (incorporation of the Second Amendment against the states).
Ass’n of N.J. Rifle & Pistol Clubs, Inc. v. Att’y Gen., 910 F.3d 106 (3d Cir. 2018) (applies intermediate scrutiny and a functional approach to Second Amendment restrictions).