William David Haught II v. David Fletcher, individually and as mayor of the Town of Belle, WV, and Town of Belle, WV, a municipal corporation, 20-0349

Plaintiff William David Haught II is a Town of Belle patrolman; defendant David Fletcher is the town mayor.
Fletcher allegedly told town council members and another patrolman that Haught had an extramarital affair with a citizen’s wife while on duty and that a pay raise was denied for that reason.
Haught alleged the statements were false, made with knowledge of falsity and with intent to harm his reputation (malice), and asserted defamation and Policeman’s Bill of Rights claims.
The circuit court granted a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of the defamation claim against Fletcher, concluding the communications were protected by a qualified privilege (internal personnel discussion) and that privilege was not abused.
The Town and Fletcher (official capacity) claims were dismissed on governmental-immunity and related grounds; Haught did not appeal those rulings.
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reversed the dismissal in part, holding that Haught’s pleaded allegation of malice precludes dismissal on qualified-privilege grounds and remanded for further proceedings.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the alleged statements are protected by qualified privilege such that dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) was proper	Haught: no—he pleaded Fletcher made the statements knowing they were false and with malice, which defeats the privilege	Fletcher: yes—the statements were made in good faith about a town personnel matter to those with a legitimate interest	Reversed: pleaded malice prevents resolving qualified-privilege defense on a motion to dismiss; remand for further proceedings
Whether allegations of malice are sufficient to overcome qualified privilege at pleading stage	Haught: his complaint alleges knowledge of falsity and intent to harm, which must be taken as true on a 12(b)(6) motion	Fletcher: absence of publication to outsiders shows good faith and no malice	Held: Allegations that defendant knew statements were false and acted maliciously suffice to survive 12(b)(6) (per Zsigray precedent)
Whether the court may, as a matter of law, decide the existence/abuse of qualified privilege on the pleadings	Haught: factual disputes about motive, knowledge, and good faith are for the jury	Fletcher: court can decide privilege where statements were limited to officials with legitimate interest	Held: The court may decide privilege as a question of law in the absence of factual disputes, but here factual inferences must be drawn for plaintiff, so premature to grant dismissal

State ex rel. McGraw v. Scott Runyan Pontiac-Buick, Inc., 194 W. Va. 770, 461 S.E.2d 516 (1995) (standard of appellate de novo review of dismissals)
Crump v. Beckley Newspapers, Inc., 173 W. Va. 699, 320 S.E.2d 70 (1983) (elements of a private-figure defamation claim)
Zsigray v. Langman, 243 W. Va. 163, 842 S.E.2d 716 (2020) (qualified-privilege doctrine and that pleaded malice can defeat privilege at pleading stage)
Dzinglski v. Weirton Steel Corp., 191 W. Va. 278, 445 S.E.2d 219 (1994) (qualified privilege exists when made in good faith on matters of interest/duty; bad motive defeats it)
Swearingen v. Parkersburg Sentinel Co., 125 W. Va. 731, 26 S.E.2d 209 (1943) (existence or abuse of qualified privilege is a question of law absent factual dispute)
Belcher v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 211 W. Va. 712, 568 S.E.2d 19 (2002) (examples of qualified privilege where statements were made during investigations to those with legitimate interest)