113 N.E.3d 742
Ind. Ct. App.2018Background
- In March 2015, William D. Bradley was accused of molesting his six‑year‑old granddaughter T.S.; allegations included oral contact, digital vaginal penetration, and fondling.
- D.B. observed T.S. on Bradley’s lap under a blanket, heard T.S. say “no,” and later reported the incident; a forensic interview recorded T.S.’s statements describing the acts.
- The State charged Bradley with two counts of Level 1 child molesting (oral contact; digital penetration), one count Level 4 child molesting (fondling), and one count Level 4 incest.
- Bradley’s first trial ended in a mistrial; he sought discharge under Ind. Crim. R. 4(C) both before the first trial and before the retrial.
- At retrial the jury convicted on all four counts; the trial court sentenced Bradley to an aggregate 30 years. Bradley appealed raising speedy‑trial, double jeopardy, evidentiary, sufficiency, and prosecutor‑misconduct claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Bradley) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Speedy trial — Rule 4(C) & constitutional speedy‑trial | Delays were justified (continuances, unavailable witnesses, defendant‑requested continuances); Rule 4(C) deadlines not violated; constitutional claim fails after balancing Barker factors | Rule 4(C) discharge motions and constitutional speedy‑trial protections were violated by excessive delay between arrest and retrial | Court affirmed: Rule 4(C) motions properly denied (first motion premature; Rule 4(C) does not govern post‑mistrial retrial delay). Constitutional claim denied after balancing delay, reasons, defendant’s acquiescence, and lack of prejudice. |
| Double jeopardy (very‑same‑act / actual‑evidence) | Distinct elements (intent for fondling count; incest requires familial relationship); convictions supported | Counts 3 (fondling) and 4 (incest) duplicate acts underlying Counts 1 and 2 (same factual conduct) and thus violate double jeopardy / very‑same‑act rule | Partially reversed: convictions for Counts 3 and 4 vacated because it was reasonably possible jury used same acts as the basis for Counts 1 & 2; Counts 1 & 2 affirmed. |
| Admission of prior testimony (impeachment) | A.S.’s prior trial testimony inconsistent and admissible as prior inconsistent statement | Trial court erred by excluding A.S.’s prior testimony, impairing cross‑examination | Affirmed: exclusion not an abuse of discretion because prior testimony was hearsay (A.S. lacked personal knowledge of penetration) and defendant did not offer proof it was admissible as an excited utterance. |
| Sufficiency of evidence & prosecutor comment (fundamental error) | Evidence (T.S. recorded statements; D.B. corroboration) suffices for Counts 1 & 2; prosecutor’s comment was not so prejudicial to require reversal | T.S.’s statements are incredible; prosecutor’s comment that Bradley had “a guilty look” required intervention and reversal | Sufficiency: Counts 1 (oral contact) and 2 (digital penetration) affirmed—T.S.’s recorded statements and D.B.’s testimony provided sufficient evidence. Fundamental error: prosecutor’s remark deemed de minimis; no reversal. |
Key Cases Cited
- Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32 (Ind. 1999) (actual‑evidence test for double jeopardy)
- Guyton v. State, 771 N.E.2d 1141 (Ind. 2002) (recognizes very‑same‑act test distinct from Richardson)
- Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (four‑factor balancing test for constitutional speedy trial)
- Woodson v. State, 466 N.E.2d 432 (Ind. 1984) (absence of key witness is good cause to extend Rule 4 deadlines)
- Griffith v. State, 59 N.E.3d 947 (Ind. 2016) (applying Barker factors under Indiana law)
- Meehan v. State, 7 N.E.3d 255 (Ind. 2014) (sufficiency support for sexual‑contact convictions)