William August Lockler, III v. Pamela Michelle Barr Lockler, E2016-02308-COA-R3-CV

William and Pamela Lockler married in 2002, separated in 2005, and divorced in 2007; the divorce judgment addressed property, alimony, custody, and attorney’s fees.
The 2007 judgment included a provision: “If [wife] is entitled under federal law to receive any portion of [husband’s] military retirement benefits, then she is awarded one-half (1/2) of those benefits earned during the parties’ marriage.”
At the time of the divorce, the parties disputed division of husband’s military retirement; each filed Rule 9 suggestions of equitable settlement (wife sought half, husband sought none).
Husband retired from the Army in December 2014 after over 22 years’ service; wife then petitioned in 2015 to reopen the judgment and claim one-half of the retirement accrued during the marriage.
Trial court interpreted the 2007 judgment to award wife one-half of the marital portion of husband’s military retirement and granted her petition; husband appealed, arguing “entitled” requires a present federal right to payment.
The Court of Appeals reviewed the judgment de novo, considered the record and parties’ earlier settlement suggestions, and affirmed that the trial court intended to award wife one-half of the retirement earned during the marriage.

Issue	Pamela’s Argument	Lockler’s Argument	Held
Does the phrase “If [wife] is entitled under federal law to receive any portion of [husband’s] military retirement benefits” mean wife must have a federal legal right to the funds or merely be eligible under federal law?	“Entitled” means allowed/eligible under federal law; state court intended to award half of marital portion when wife becomes eligible.	“Entitled” means an actual federal right to receive payment; because she lacked such a right at the time, she is not entitled to half.	The phrase was ambiguous; considering the record and settlement suggestions, the court concluded Judge Stanley intended to award wife one-half of the retirement accrued during the marriage (affirming trial court).

Barnes v. Barnes, 193 S.W.3d 495 (Tenn. 2006) (standards for reviewing and construing judgments)
Pruitt v. Pruitt, 293 S.W.3d 537 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008) (principles for interpreting judgments)
Konvalinka v. Chattanooga-Hamilton Cnty. Hosp. Auth., 249 S.W.3d 346 (Tenn. 2008) (use of ordinary meaning and court intent in construing instruments)
Stidham v. Fickle Heirs, 643 S.W.2d 324 (Tenn. 1982) (give effect to intention of the court in judgments)
Staubach Retail Servs.-Se., LLC v. H.G. Hill Realty Co., 160 S.W.3d 521 (Tenn. 2005) (interpretation using usual, natural meaning)
Planters Gin Co. v. Fed. Compress & Warehouse Co., 78 S.W.3d 885 (Tenn. 2002) (contract/judgment construction principles)
Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Tenn. v. Eddins, 516 S.W.2d 76 (Tenn. 1974) (give force and effect to every part of a judgment)
Branch v. Branch, 249 S.W.2d 581 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1952) (consistency and reasonableness in construing judgments)
Morgan Keegan & Co. v. Smythe, 401 S.W.3d 595 (Tenn. 2013) (when ambiguous, interpret judgments in light of record and issues before the court)
Johnson v. Johnson, 37 S.W.3d 892 (Tenn. 2001) (military retirement as marital property subject to equitable distribution)
Kendrick v. Kendrick, 902 S.W.2d 918 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995) (pension rights are deferred compensation and constitute property)