William Attix v. Carrington Mortgage Services, LLC, 35 F.4th 1284

In May 2020 Attix paid his mortgage using Speedpay's phone service and accepted Speedpay's online terms, which included an arbitration clause covering “any dispute arising from or relating to Service or your Payment(s).”
The Speedpay terms expressly stated “The arbitrator shall also decide what is subject to arbitration unless prohibited by law,” and incorporated the AAA Consumer Arbitration Rules, which vest arbitrators with power to rule on their own jurisdiction.
Attix sued Carrington (his mortgage servicer) in federal court under the FDCPA and Florida law, alleging unlawful collection/retention of convenience fees; he did not opt out of arbitration.
Carrington moved to compel arbitration; the district court held the Speedpay arbitration agreement applied but concluded 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(e)(3) (Dodd-Frank) barred enforcement and denied the motion, declining to treat the delegation clause as operative.
On appeal the Eleventh Circuit held the delegation language plus AAA incorporation constituted clear-and-unmistakable evidence that arbitrability issues (including whether Dodd-Frank bars arbitration) are for an arbitrator to decide, reversed, and remanded with instructions to compel arbitration and stay proceedings.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Who decides arbitrability (delegation clause)?	Attix: clause is limited by “unless prohibited by law” and thus courts should decide whether Dodd‑Frank prohibits arbitration.	Carrington: express delegation + AAA incorporation clearly and unmistakably delegate arbitrability to an arbitrator.	Court: The express clause and incorporation of AAA rules clearly and unmistakeably delegate all gateway arbitrability questions to an arbitrator.
Does Dodd‑Frank §1639c(e)(3) bar arbitration of Attix’s claims?	Attix: §1639c(e)(3) makes mortgage‑related arbitration provisions unenforceable, so his FDCPA suit cannot be compelled to arbitration.	Carrington: the scope/coverage argument belongs to the arbitrator; also contends the Speedpay terms fall outside §1639c(e)(3).	Court: Did not decide on the merits; because delegation is valid and not specifically challenged, the arbitrator must decide whether §1639c(e)(3) applies.
Did Attix specifically challenge the delegation clause?	Attix: frames his Dodd‑Frank challenge as specific enough to defeat delegation.	Carrington: Attix challenged only the primary arbitration agreement, not the delegation clause itself.	Court: Attix did not mount a specific substantive challenge to the delegation clause; therefore the clause stands and its enforceability is for the arbitrator.

Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 524 (when contract delegates arbitrability, courts may not decide that issue)
Rent‑A‑Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63 (delegation clause is a separate arbitration agreement and severable)
First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (clear-and-unmistakable standard for delegating arbitrability)
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (FAA favors enforcement of arbitration agreements)
JPay, Inc. v. Kobel, 904 F.3d 923 (11th Cir.: incorporation of AAA jurisdictional rule clearly delegates arbitrability)
Given v. M&T Bank Corp., 674 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir.: similar delegation language sends gateway issues to arbitrator)
Parm v. Nat’l Bank of Cal., N.A., 835 F.3d 1331 (11th Cir.: specific challenge to delegation (illusory forum) must be decided by court)
Terminix Int’l Co. v. Palmer Ranch Ltd. P’ship, 432 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir.: incorporation of AAA rules manifests clear intent to delegate)