114 A.3d 82
R.I.2015Background
- Rudolph T. Bettez executed a September 2009 will (drafted by Attorney Daniel Stone) that excluded his son William from the Bettez Trust, stating William already had received adequate provision by loans, forgiven debts, rent concessions, and other transfers. Rudolph married Joyce in October 2009 and had executed a prenuptial agreement and new will in anticipation of that marriage.
- William had a long‑standing strained relationship with Rudolph, including unpaid rent, a delinquent $130,200 promissory note (secured by Rudolph), and other monetary transfers and forgiveness of debts. William admitted many of these facts in deposition.
- After Rudolph’s death, Robert (another son) petitioned to probate the September 2009 will. The Probate Court admitted the will by consent order; William appealed to Superior Court arguing lack of testamentary capacity and undue influence, but later abandoned the capacity claim and proceeded only on undue influence.
- Defendants (Rudolph’s co‑executors) moved for summary judgment in Superior Court. The Superior Court granted the motion, concluding William produced no competent evidence of undue influence; final judgment was entered for defendants.
- William appealed to the Rhode Island Supreme Court, which summarily affirmed the Superior Court’s grant of summary judgment, finding no genuine issue of material fact on undue influence and that William’s allegations were speculative and unsupported.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Rudolph’s will was the product of undue influence | William: Siblings, Joyce, and Attorney Stone unduly influenced Rudolph to disinherit him; Stone’s prior representation of William created a conflict enabling influence | Defendants: No competent evidence of undue influence; Rudolph expressly stated reasons for exclusion (prior loans/payments/forgiven debts); Stone’s role proper and not shown to be coercive | Court: No genuine issue of material fact; summary judgment for defendants—will not set aside for undue influence |
| Whether Attorney Stone’s prior work for William created a disqualifying conflict or evidence of undue influence | William: Stone used knowledge from representing William to influence drafting of will against William | Defendants: Stone’s occasional corporate work for William did not produce evidence he exerted undue influence; no direct or circumstantial proof of misuse of confidential information | Court: Allegation speculative and unsupported; insufficient to survive summary judgment |
| Whether probate appeal required trial rather than summary disposition | William: Requested denial or deferral of summary judgment because related trust litigation was pending in another county | Defendants: Summary disposition appropriate based on the probate record and absence of disputed facts | Court: William failed to explain how separate action precluded summary judgment; court declined to address the unrelated litigation and affirmed summary judgment |
Key Cases Cited
- Sola v. Leighton, 45 A.3d 502 (discussing de novo review of summary judgment in Rhode Island)
- Sullo v. Greenberg, 68 A.3d 404 (nonmoving party’s burden to produce competent evidence to avoid summary judgment)
- Plunkett v. State, 869 A.2d 1185 (summary judgment standard and record components)
- In re Estate of Picillo, 99 A.3d 975 (definition and fact‑intensive nature of undue influence inquiry)
- Filippi v. Filippi, 818 A.2d 608 (factors considered in undue influence: relationship, condition, opportunity, acts/declarations)
- Bourg v. Bristol Boat Co., 705 A.2d 969 (affirmative duty of nonmoving party to show genuine factual dispute)