Willard Hall v. F. Haws, 861 F.3d 977

Background

In 1999 Stephen Foth was murdered; Lena Hixon testified that co-defendants Ronnie Sherrors and Willard Hall stabbed and robbed him; Hixon received a plea deal and her testimony was the centerpiece of the prosecution’s case.
Hall and Sherrors were convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life without parole; the trial court had instructed the jury with CALJIC 2.15 (permissive inference from possession of recently stolen property with "slight" corroboration).
On direct appeal the California Court of Appeal held use of CALJIC 2.15 was erroneous but applied the state Watson harmless‑error standard and affirmed; the California Supreme Court denied review.
Hall filed a federal habeas petition in 2005; it was dismissed without prejudice in 2006 after Hall failed to follow a district-court order to abandon an unexhausted claim or dismiss and return to state court.
Sherrors separately obtained federal habeas relief based on the CALJIC 2.15 error; after the Ninth Circuit affirmed that grant, Hall moved under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) to reopen his dismissed habeas case, arguing extraordinary circumstances (he reasonably believed he was co‑submitted in Sherrors’s petition).
The district court reopened Hall’s case under Rule 60(b)(6) and granted habeas relief; the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Hall’s Rule 60(b) motion was not a disguised successive petition nor barred by AEDPA limitations/exhaustion, (2) CALJIC 2.15 violated due process in this trial, and (3) the error was not harmless under Brecht.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Hall)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
1) Whether Hall’s motion to reopen was a true Rule 60(b) motion or a disguised second/successive habeas application under AEDPA	Hall: motion attacked non‑merits dismissal (failure to comply with district order), so it is a bona fide Rule 60(b) motion (Gonzalez framework)	State: motion functions as an "application" for habeas relief and thus is barred as successive or untimely under AEDPA	Court: Motion was a true Rule 60(b) motion (attacked non‑merits dismissal), so AEDPA’s successive‑petition bar did not apply
2) Whether AEDPA’s statute of limitations or exhaustion rules barred consideration of the reopened motion	Hall: his Rule 60(b) motion raised no new "claim," so AEDPA limitations/exhaustion do not apply	State: even if Rule 60(b) in form, AEDPA timing/exhaustion should control before relief granted	Court: Because the motion contained no new substantive claim, AEDPA’s statute of limitations and exhaustion rules did not bar Rule 60(b) relief
3) Whether CALJIC 2.15 (permissive inference from possession of recently stolen property with slight corroboration) violated due process	Hall: the permissive inference here was irrational — possession of a ring plus slight corroboration does not make murder guilt reasonably likely; instruction relieved prosecutor’s burden	State: error was state‑law only; the inference may be rational here given the totality of evidence; state court reasonably applied Watson	Court: Instruction created an unconstitutional permissive inference in this trial; the California Court of Appeal’s contrary conclusion was an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent (Francis, Ulster Cty.)
4) Whether any constitutional error was harmless (Brecht/Chapman)	Hall: error had substantial and injurious effect given weak corroboration and Hixon’s inconsistent/unreliable testimony	State: any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; other compelling corroboration supported conviction	Court: Under Brecht the court has "grave doubt" whether the jury would have convicted absent the instruction; error was not harmless — habeas relief warranted unless state grants new trial

Key Cases Cited

Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (Rule 60(b) may be used to attack non‑merits rulings; distinguishes true Rule 60(b) motions from successive habeas applications)
Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (permissive inference violates due process if the inferred conclusion is not justified by reason and common sense)
County Court of Ulster Cty. v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 (permissive inferences constitutional only if the inferred fact is substantially likely to flow from proven facts)
Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (federal habeas relief for trial error requires showing "actual prejudice" — grave doubt standard)
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (harmless‑beyond‑a‑reasonable‑doubt standard for constitutional trial errors)
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (federal courts must determine whether fairminded jurists could disagree with state‑court decision under AEDPA)
Johnson v. Williams, 568 U.S. 289 (presumption that unaddressed federal claims were adjudicated on the merits; Harrington framework applies)
Phelps v. Alameida, 569 F.3d 1120 (Ninth Circuit factors for extraordinary circumstances under Rule 60(b)(6))
Deck v. Jenkins, 814 F.3d 954 (discussing interplay of Brecht and AEDPA/Chapman in habeas review)