47 F.4th 917
9th Cir.2022Background
- Will Co., a Japanese adult-video producer with U.S. copyright registrations, discovered 13 of its videos posted without authorization on ThisAV.com and sent DMCA takedown notices.
- ThisAV.com is owned by Hong Kong company Youhaha Marketing & Promotion Ltd. (YMP); Ka Yeung Lee is a YMP director. The site hosts user-uploaded videos and is monetized via third-party ads.
- Defendants hosted the site with a U.S. provider (servers in Utah) and used Cloudflare CDN services covering North America; legal-compliance pages (DMCA, 2257, Privacy/Terms) are in English and reference U.S. law.
- During the relevant period (Apr–Jun 2020) the site had ~28 million views; ~4.6% (~1.3 million) of views were from the U.S.
- The district court dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction, finding Will Co. failed to show ThisAV.com was “expressly aimed” at the U.S. or caused jurisdictionally significant harm there.
- The Ninth Circuit reversed: applying Rule 4(k)(2) and the Calder effects test, it found defendants purposefully directed the site at U.S. viewers (hosting/CDN choices, U.S.-focused compliance pages) and that harm in the U.S. was foreseeable and substantial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Rule 4(k)(2) permits specific personal jurisdiction over foreign operators for a federal copyright claim | Will Co.: Yes; claim arises under federal law, defendants not subject to any state court, and due process allows jurisdiction because defendants purposefully directed conduct at the U.S. | Defs.: No; lack general jurisdiction and did not expressly aim site at U.S.; foreseeability and some U.S. traffic alone insufficient | Court: Rule 4(k)(2) can apply; due process satisfied because defendants purposefully directed conduct at the U.S. |
| Whether defendants committed an intentional act under Calder for jurisdictional purposes | Will Co.: Creating/operating the site, registering domain, hosting choices and CDN purchases are intentional acts | Defs.: Operation and passive availability do not equate to intentional targeting of U.S. | Court: Intentional-act element met (operation, domain purchase, hosting/CDN choices) |
| Whether defendants "expressly aimed" the site at the U.S. (Calder second prong) | Will Co.: Hosting in Utah, buying North America CDN, U.S.-focused DMCA/2257/privacy pages in English, and substantial U.S. views show appeal to and profit from U.S. market | Defs.: Server/CDN location alone insufficient; compliance pages may be template language; anticipating U.S. users ≠ targeting them | Court: Express aiming satisfied—defendants both appealed to and profited from U.S. audience; disputes resolved for plaintiff at this stage |
| Whether harm occurred in and was foreseeable to the U.S. (Calder third prong) | Will Co.: >1.3M U.S. visits is substantial; takedown notice put defendants on notice of infringement in U.S. | Defs.: Brunt of harm elsewhere; U.S. views are a small percentage | Court: Harm in U.S. was jurisdictionally sufficient and foreseeable; the "brunt" need not be in the forum |
Key Cases Cited
- Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984) (established the "effects" test for purposeful direction)
- Dole Food Co. v. Watts, 303 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2002) (adopted Calder framework in Ninth Circuit)
- Mavrix Photo, Inc. v. Brand Techs., Inc., 647 F.3d 1218 (9th Cir. 2011) (express-aiming requires appeal to and profit from forum audience)
- AMA Multimedia, LLC v. Wanat, 970 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 2020) (mere web accessibility and U.S. traffic insufficient to show express aiming)
- Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 465 U.S. 770 (1984) (small percentage of national distribution may still constitute substantial forum harm)
- Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et L’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2006) (forum-specific substantiality of harm governs jurisdiction)
- Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797 (9th Cir. 2004) (Calder test articulated for tort claims)
- Pebble Beach Co. v. Caddy, 453 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2006) (Rule 4(k)(2) personal-jurisdiction framework)
