601 U.S. 209
U.S.2024Background
- Situ Kamu Wilkinson, a Trinidad and Tobago national, overstayed his tourist visa in the United States and was arrested by ICE after criminal charges (later dropped).
- Wilkinson sought cancellation of removal based on alleged "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" to his U.S. citizen son, M., who suffers from severe asthma and relies on Wilkinson for emotional and financial support.
- The Immigration Judge (IJ) found Wilkinson credible but denied relief, concluding M.'s hardship did not reach the statutory threshold; the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed without opinion.
- The Third Circuit dismissed Wilkinson’s petition for lack of jurisdiction, holding the hardship determination was an unreviewable discretionary judgment.
- The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether such hardship determinations constitute reviewable mixed questions of law and fact, or are purely discretionary and thus barred from judicial review.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff’s Argument | Defendant’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the application of the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard to established facts is reviewable as a question of law under §1252(a)(2)(D). | The hardship determination is a mixed question of law and fact, and reviewable as a “question of law” under §1252(a)(2)(D). | Application of the standard is discretionary and primarily factual, making it unreviewable under the jurisdiction-stripping provision. | Application of the hardship standard is a reviewable mixed question of law and fact; the Third Circuit erred in dismissing for lack of jurisdiction. |
| Whether prior precedent (Guerrero-Lasprilla) compels review of mixed questions even when they are mostly factual. | Guerrero-Lasprilla interprets “questions of law” to include all mixed questions, regardless of their factual nature. | Guerrero-Lasprilla should be limited to judicially-created legal standards and not statutory standards like hardship provisions. | Guerrero-Lasprilla is not so limited; all mixed questions, statutory or judicial, are reviewable. |
| Impact of statutory history and prior case law (e.g., Williamsport Wire Rope Co.) on judicial review of hardship determinations. | Statutory history and similar phrases in other discretionary relief do not preclude review of the hardship standard. | Historical and other statutory provisions indicate Congress intended to bar judicial review of discretionary hardship findings. | Statutory history does not override express statutory language or prior precedent allowing review. |
| Scope of judicial review over factual findings underlying eligibility determinations. | Only the application of law to facts (the mixed question) is reviewable, not agency fact-finding or credibility determinations. | Allowing review of mixed questions would eviscerate jurisdictional bars and invite court review of all removal decisions. | Judicial review is limited to legal/mixed questions; underlying factual findings remain unreviewable. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321 (explains that the syllabus is not part of the opinion)
- Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 589 U.S. 221 (holds application of legal standards to facts constitutes a reviewable mixed question of law and fact)
- Patel v. Garland, 596 U.S. 328 (clarifies that pure questions of fact underlying discretionary relief denials remain unreviewable)
- INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (leads to the enactment of review-restoring provision for constitutional and legal issues)