Wilkins v. Daniels
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180321
| S.D. Ohio | 2012Background
- This case challenges the Ohio Dangerous Wild Animals and Restricted Snakes Act as unconstitutional.
- Plaintiffs, exotic-animal owners, seek to enjoin enforcement and retain possession of their animals.
- The Act requires registration, microchips, and imposes permit-based retention with numerous exemptions.
- Exemptions include AZA/ZAA accreditation, wildlife sanctuaries, and other designated entities; some exemptions do not require joining private organizations.
- Plaintiffs allege risks to animal welfare and economic hardship; the court held a hearing and consolidated it with trial on the merits.
- Court denies Plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary/permanent injunction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does the Act compel association with AZA/ZAA in violation of the First Amendment? | Huntsman asserts compulsion to join AZA/ZAA violates association rights. | Act does not compel membership; numerous exemptions exist and private choice remains. | No First Amendment violation; not compelled association. |
| Does the microchip requirement deny due process without a hearing or exemption procedure? | Owners lack a process to object to microchipping prior to enforcement. | Due process is provided via Chapter 119 hearings and available equitable defenses; prior hearing not required. | No due process violation; hearing mechanism exists and equitable defenses are available. |
| Is there a taking under the Fifth Amendment from microchip implantation or use restrictions? | Forced microchip implantation constitutes a permanent physical taking or regulatory taking. | Microchipping is a minimally invasive regulatory measure, not a physical taking; regulation acceptable. | No taking; Act does not effect a compensable taking. |
| Does the Act have a rational basis under the Due Process and Takings analyses? | Statute lacks empirical support and targets individuals without adequate remedy. | Legitimate public-safety and animal-welfare aims justify the regulation; rational basis is satisfied. | Yes, the Act has a rational basis; claims fail. |
| Do the preliminary injunction factors favor relief for Plaintiffs? | Likely success on merits and irreparable harm due to microchiping and limits on ownership. | Public safety interests and rational basis negate likelihood of success and irreparable harm. | Factors do not favor granting TRO or injunction. |
Key Cases Cited
- Leary v. Daeschner, 228 F.3d 729 (6th Cir.2000) (four-factor TRO/preliminary injunction test)
- McPherson v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 119 F.3d 453 (6th Cir.1997) (multiplicity of factors in injunctive relief)
- Sandidson v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 64 F.3d 1026 (6th Cir.1995) (test for preliminary injunction framework)
- Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (Supreme Court, 1979) (police power and regulation of property rights under takings analysis)
- Lucas v. S. C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (Supreme Court, 1992) (regulatory takings and expected use of property)
- Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (Supreme Court, 2005) (takings and regulatory impact analysis)