Wilkins v. Connecticut Child Birth & Women's Center, 171 A.3d 88

Background

Kristin Wilkins gave birth at Women’s Health Associates (the defendant) on April 17, 2007; immediate and early postpartum exams by midwives documented no obstetrical laceration.
Months later Wilkins reported symptoms; examinations by urogynecologists in 2008 diagnosed a fourth‑degree obstetrical laceration (complete perineal disruption/cloaca) and she underwent surgical repair.
Wilkins sued for medical negligence alleging defendant failed to diagnose, inform, treat, and timely refer for a fourth‑degree and/or severe tear of vaginal tissue, perineal skin/muscle, and anal sphincter on April 17–18, 2007.
At trial the plaintiff’s experts testified the injury was a fourth‑degree laceration occurring at delivery; the defendant’s theory was that no such laceration occurred at delivery.
The trial court submitted a threshold interrogatory asking the jury whether Wilkins had proven by a preponderance that she sustained (a) a fourth‑degree laceration and/or (b) a severe tear of vaginal tissue, perineal skin/muscle, and anal sphincter during labor and delivery; if the jury answered “no” it was to return a verdict for the defendant.
During deliberations the jury asked whether the listed injuries had to be found as a whole or could be evaluated separately; the court instructed the jury to evaluate the listed “severe tear” components as a whole. The jury answered “no” to the threshold interrogatory and returned a defense verdict. Wilkins appealed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the court abused discretion by submitting a threshold interrogatory requiring a finding of a fourth‑degree laceration/severe tear before the jury could award damages	Interrogatory created an unnecessary, prejudicial threshold that precluded verdict for Wilkins based on other possible injuries or lesser tears	Interrogatory accurately reflected plaintiff’s theory and the central factual dispute (existence of a fourth‑degree/severe tear at delivery)	No abuse of discretion; interrogatory was consistent with pleadings, evidence, and plaintiff’s own trial theory
Whether the court erred in instructing the jury to evaluate the listed components of the “severe tear” as a whole rather than separately	Instruction prevented the jury from finding for plaintiff if only one component was injured	Instruction followed the complaint’s language and the evidence treating the components as a unitary severe injury	No error; court’s clarification was consistent with complaint and expert testimony
Whether the interrogatory misled the jury or impermissibly narrowed issues beyond the pleadings/evidence	Interrogatory excluded claims not expressly limited to a fourth‑degree laceration in the complaint	Interrogatory used language from the complaint (at plaintiff’s request) and mirrored the evidence and experts’ focus	No; interrogatory matched the pleaded claims and the proof presented
Whether the court’s supplemental answer during deliberations ‘‘cemented’’ error	Supplemental instruction compounded any prejudice by locking jury into an all‑or‑nothing view	Supplemental instruction merely explained the phrasing and allowed separate determinations via the interrogatory’s “and/or” wording	No; the supplemental instruction was proper and did not prejudice plaintiff

Key Cases Cited

Champeau v. Blitzer, 157 Conn. App. 201 (Conn. App. 2016) (trial court has broad discretion to submit jury interrogatories)
Chapman v. Norfolk & Dedham Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 39 Conn. App. 306 (Conn. App. 1995) (interrogatories must be consistent with pleadings and evidence)
Hammer v. Mount Sinai Hospital, 25 Conn. App. 702 (Conn. App. 1991) (function of interrogatories is to guide jury reasoning and record it)
Viera v. Cohen, 283 Conn. 412 (Conn. 2007) (purpose of interrogatories is to elicit material fact determinations and test verdict correctness)
Carrano v. Yale‑New Haven Hosp., 279 Conn. 622 (Conn. 2006) (medical malpractice claims generally require expert testimony)