Wilkes v. City of Greenville, 369 N.C. 730

On April 21, 2010 Wilkes, a long-time landscaper for City of Greenville, was injured in an on-the-job motor vehicle collision; employer filed a Form 60 admitting compensability and paid temporary total disability and medical benefits.
Wilkes complained of back/leg pain, concussion symptoms, tinnitus, anxiety, depression, and sleep loss and sought additional medical treatment including neuro/psychiatric evaluation.
Employer requested a hearing (Form 33) January 18, 2011; the Commission held hearings, took medical depositions, and issued findings in February–April 2013 and an opinion and award April 9, 2014.
The Full Commission found tinnitus compensable and entitled to treatment, but concluded Wilkes had not proven his anxiety/depression were caused by the work injury and terminated temporary total disability after January 18, 2011.
The Court of Appeals vacated the Commission’s refusal to apply the Parsons presumption to psychological treatment and reversed the termination of disability; the Supreme Court granted discretionary review.
The Supreme Court (1) affirmed that an admitted compensable injury (Form 60/approved admission) gives rise to a rebuttable presumption that additional medical treatment is related to that compensable injury (Parsons presumption), and (2) modified and affirmed the Court of Appeals on disability, remanding for findings on how Wilkes’s compensable tinnitus affects his wage-earning capacity.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether an employer’s admission of compensability (Form 60 / approved payment) creates a presumption that additional medical treatment is related to the compensable injury	Wilkes: Parsons presumption applies; after compensability is admitted, employee need not re-prove causation for additional treatment	City: Admission is only to compensability generally; employee must still prove causation for specific conditions/treatment	Court: Affirmed Parsons presumption applies where compensability is admitted under N.C.G.S. §97-82(b); employer may rebut it
Whether Commission erred terminating temporary total disability after employer’s Form 33 (Jan 18, 2011)	Wilkes: Commission’s findings show he is incapable of returning to prior work and preexisting limitations make a job search futile, so disability should continue	City: Commission correctly applied evidence and ended benefits when dispute was pending; Russell-based standards not met	Court: Modified/affirmed Court of Appeals; remanded because Commission failed to assess effect of compensable tinnitus on wage-earning capacity and must make specific findings

Parsons v. Pantry, Inc., 126 N.C. App. 540 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997) (establishing presumption that additional treatment is related to a previously adjudicated compensable injury)
Perez v. American Airlines/AMR Corp., 174 N.C. App. 128 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005) (applying Parsons presumption to admissions/payments)
Johnson v. S. Tire Sales & Serv., 358 N.C. 701 (N.C. 2004) (discussing limits of presumption of ongoing disability where direct payment occurs)
Clark v. Wal-Mart, 360 N.C. 41 (N.C. 2005) (clarifying that Form 60 admissions do not automatically create a presumption of disability)
Mehaffey v. Burger King, 367 N.C. 120 (N.C. 2013) (employer’s duty to provide medical compensation under the Act)
Hilliard v. Apex Cabinet Co., 305 N.C. 593 (N.C. 1983) (elements the Commission must find to support a legal conclusion of disability)
Peoples v. Cone Mills Corp., 316 N.C. 426 (N.C. 1986) (consideration of age, education, and work history in assessing wage-earning capacity)
Russell v. Lowes Product Distribution, 108 N.C. App. 762 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993) (examples of methods to prove futility of job search; not an exhaustive or mandatory test)