Wilkes & Mchugh, P.A. v. LTC Consulting, L.P.
306 Ga. 252
Ga.2019Background
- Florida law firm Wilkes & McHugh and attorney Gary Wimbish ran full‑page newspaper ads identifying local nursing homes, summarizing government survey “deficiencies,” and soliciting residents’ families to contact the firm.
- Three nursing‑home owners (Powder Springs, Bonterra, Rockdale) sued, alleging violations of OCGA § 31‑7‑3.2(j) (limits on use of survey results), Georgia UDTPA, and false advertising statutes; plaintiffs obtained a TRO and expanded TRO enjoining the specific ads.
- Defendants filed an anti‑SLAPP motion under revised OCGA § 9‑11‑11.1 (2016 amendment modeled on Cal. § 425.16), arguing the ads are protected speech and that § 31‑7‑3.2(j) is unconstitutional.
- The trial court heard the anti‑SLAPP motion, denied it at the second (merits) stage, and the defendants appealed; the Supreme Court of Georgia accepted the case because plaintiffs challenged constitutionality of a statute.
- The Supreme Court held defendants made the required threshold showing that the claims arose from protected speech, vacated the denial, and remanded for the trial court to apply the correct two‑step anti‑SLAPP analysis and address unresolved statutory and constitutional questions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether plaintiffs’ claims "arise from" protected petition/speech under OCGA § 9‑11‑11.1(b)(1) | Ads are commercial/regulated conduct not fully protected; statute applies to this conduct | Ads are speech in connection with public concern and fit within § 9‑11‑11.1(c) | Defendants met threshold—running the ads could reasonably be construed as protected activity (remanded for further analysis) |
| Whether plaintiffs established a "probability" of prevailing (second‑step anti‑SLAPP) | Verified complaint + TRO show probability of success on statutory and UDTPA/false advertising claims | Plaintiffs failed to state and substantiate legally sufficient claims; evidence insufficient under anti‑SLAPP standards | Trial court failed to apply proper two‑step test at step two; remand to reassess whether claims are legally sufficient and prima facie supported |
| Whether the cited statutes (OCGA § 31‑7‑3.2(j), OCGA § 10‑1‑427, UDTPA) apply to and can be enforced against the ads | Statutes regulate misuse of survey data and false advertising and thus cover the ads | The statutory text, context, and enforcement scheme may not naturally reach attorney ads; constitutional/separation issues exist | Court declined to resolve on appeal; remanded for trial court to address statutory scope, separation‑of‑powers, and First Amendment questions in first instance |
| Procedural/appealability issues under the 2016 anti‑SLAPP revision | Plaintiffs relied on TRO and prior rulings to justify denying motion | Defendants relied on new anti‑SLAPP mechanics (stay, fee shifting, immediate appeal) | Georgia Supreme Court recognized new mechanics and immediate appeal right; remanded to apply the statute's procedures correctly |
Key Cases Cited
- EarthResources, LLC v. Morgan County, 281 Ga. 396 (construing pre‑amendment anti‑SLAPP provisions) (Georgia Supreme Court case on anti‑SLAPP history)
- Denton v. Browns Mill Dev. Co., 275 Ga. 2 (Georgia Supreme Court anti‑SLAPP precedent)
- Navellier v. Sletten, 29 Cal.4th 82 (California Supreme Court on § 425.16 two‑step test and "arising from" analysis)
- Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif, 39 Cal.4th 260 (California Supreme Court on plaintiff's burden at step two)
- Taus v. Loftus, 40 Cal.4th 683 (discussion of evidentiary limits at second step of anti‑SLAPP review)
- Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity, 19 Cal.4th 1106 (clarifying that court determines legal sufficiency and prima facie support at step two)
- City of Montebello v. Vasquez, 1 Cal.5th 409 (treatment of plaintiff and defendant evidence in anti‑SLAPP proceedings)
- RCO Legal, P.S., Inc. v. Johnson, 347 Ga. App. 661 (Georgia appellate application of revised anti‑SLAPP statute)
- Grogan v. City of Dawsonville, 305 Ga. 79 (recognizing appealability under revised anti‑SLAPP statute)
- Gramiak v. Beasley, 304 Ga. 512 (remand principles when trial court misapplies standards)
- Clayton County v. City of College Park, 301 Ga. 653 (similar remand guidance)
- Southern LNG, Inc. v. MacGinnitie, 294 Ga. 657 (same)