Wilkes Jr. v. State
2015 MT 243
Mont.2015Background
- Infant Gabriel died in October 2008 from intracranial and retinal hemorrhaging; State prosecuted Wilkes for deliberate homicide based on an abusive head trauma (AHT)/shaken baby theory.
- At trial Wilkes (through counsel Scott Spencer) called only himself; defense largely did not challenge the State’s AHT experts and asserted timing-based reasonable doubt and a negligent-homicide alternative without presenting evidence. Jury convicted; Wilkes sentenced to 40 years.
- Wilkes filed a pro se post-conviction petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) and newly discovered evidence; Montana Innocence Project later supplemented the petition with expert affidavits challenging AHT and offering alternative natural-cause explanations.
- The District Court denied relief on the papers (no evidentiary hearing), concluding counsel’s choices were strategic and that Wilkes’s new expert materials would not have likely changed the outcome.
- Montana Supreme Court reviewed: held the District Court failed to adequately address the newly discovered evidence claim, and erred in disposing of the IAC claim without proper analysis; remanded for further proceedings under the Marble standard.
Issues
| Issue | Wilkes' Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether District Court adequately addressed newly discovered evidence claim | District Court failed to apply correct legal standard and did not independently analyze the claim | District Court’s summary treatment was sufficient and denial should be affirmed | Court: District Court erred; remand for independent consideration under §46‑21‑102(2)/Marble standard |
| Whether Spencer provided ineffective assistance by failing to adequately prepare/challenge AHT experts | Spencer’s inadequate preparation deprived Wilkes of a defense aligned with his objectives; Wilkes identified experts Spencer could have used | Spencer’s choices were strategic and non-prejudicial; even if challenged, outcome would be the same | Court: District Court misapplied Strickland analysis and misapprehended Wilkes’s evidence; IAC denial reversed and remanded for proper findings |
| Whether District Court correctly treated counsel’s decisions as presumptively reasonable strategic choices | Wilkes: court must examine reasonableness of underlying strategy, not just label it strategic | State: strategic label supports presumption of reasonableness | Court: strategic decisions require showing they stem from reasonable professional judgment; District Court failed to analyze underlying reasons and erred |
| Whether an evidentiary hearing was required before denial | Wilkes: hearing needed to resolve disputed expert evidence and credibility | State: court may dismiss on the record without a hearing under §46‑21‑201(1)(a) | Court: whether a hearing is needed is for the District Court on remand; Court declines to order a hearing now |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (establishes two-prong ineffective assistance test: deficient performance and prejudice)
- Marble v. State, 380 Mont. 366 (Mont. 2015) (adopts §46-21-102(2), MCA standard for newly discovered evidence in timely postconviction petitions)
- State v. Beach, 370 Mont. 163 (Mont. 2013) (discussed in Marble; court rejects concurrence’s actual-innocence standard)
- State v. Clark, 330 Mont. 8 (Mont. 2005) (discussed in Marble as using a different standard for newly discovered evidence)
- Elliott v. State, 325 Mont. 345 (Mont. 2005) (previously refused relief where petitioner offered only speculative expert availability)
- Heath v. State, 348 Mont. 361 (Mont. 2009) (standards of review for postconviction relief and evidentiary hearings)
- Soriach v. State, 311 Mont. 90 (Mont. 2002) (applies Strickland in Montana context)