Wilick v. Commissioner of Social Security, 6:15-cv-00863

Background

Plaintiff Henry Wilick, Jr. applied for DIB and SSI (filed 2009; alleged onset Nov. 7, 2008) based on bipolar disorder, anxiety/OCD, depression, and back problems; earlier SSA file found disability as of April 2007.
Administrative proceedings: initial ALJ partially found disability beginning May 1, 2010; Appeals Council remanded for further development; on remand ALJ (Nov. 6, 2013) found plaintiff not disabled through decision date; Appeals Council denied review and plaintiff sought judicial review.
Longitudinal treatment: six-year treating relationship with VAMC psychiatrist Dr. Marvin Ortez, who completed a Mental RFC finding multiple moderate limitations and marked limitations in ability to complete a normal workday/workweek and maintain consistent pace, noting medication sedation and mood swings.
ALJ’s RFC limited plaintiff to less than full range of light work, simple 1–3 step tasks, concentration periods up to 2 hours, minimal public/coworker interaction, and limited supervisor contact; ALJ gave significant weight to moderate aspects of Dr. Ortez’s opinion but little weight to his marked pace limitation, relying on non‑examining medical expert (Dr. Simonds) and other evidence.
Magistrate Judge David A. Baker recommends reversing and remanding: primary errors are improper treatment of the treating psychiatrist’s marked pace limitation (conflating pace with simple-task/concentration limits) and inadequate credibility evaluation of plaintiff and his mother; VE testimony did not account for pace restriction.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Weight given to treating psychiatrist’s opinion (marked limitation in pace/workday)	ALJ failed to apply proper treating‑physician rules and ignored Dr. Ortez’s marked limitation that plaintiff cannot complete a normal workday/workweek or maintain consistent pace.	ALJ reasonably gave significant weight to moderate findings and properly gave little weight to the marked limitation because it was unsupported by treatment notes and consistent-opinion evidence (Dr. Simonds, state agency).	Magistrate: ALJ erred by not adequately distinguishing concentration vs. pace and by relying on non‑treating opinion without resolving the treating physician’s marked pace limitation; remand required.
Credibility of plaintiff and third‑party (mother) testimony	Testimony about medication sedation, missed days, attention/focus deficits, and functional limits is consistent with Dr. Ortez’s records and should have been credited.	ALJ credited some testimony but permissibly found it outweighed by medical evidence, course of treatment, activities, and expert opinions.	Magistrate: ALJ’s credibility findings were inconsistent with earlier favorable credibility finding and treatment record; credibility should be reassessed on remand.

Key Cases Cited

McRoberts v. Bowen, 841 F.2d 1077 (11th Cir. 1988) (review limited to correct legal standards)
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (U.S. 1971) (substantial‑evidence standard)
Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553 (11th Cir. 1995) (pain standard and scope of review)
Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2004) (ALJ findings affirmed if supported by substantial evidence)
Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206 (11th Cir. 2005) (court may not reweigh evidence)
Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436 (11th Cir. 1997) (RFC focus and treating‑physician weight)
Wheeler v. Heckler, 784 F.2d 1073 (11th Cir. 1986) (conclusory treating‑physician statements may be discounted)
Schnorr v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 578 (11th Cir. 1987) (support for physician opinions)
Ealy v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec., 594 F.3d 504 (6th Cir. 2010) (distinguishing concentration from pace; unskilled work does not address pace limits)
Ramirez v. Barnhart, 372 F.3d 546 (3d Cir. 2004) (limiting to simple tasks does not capture pace deficiencies)
Craft v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 2008) (unskilled‑work limitation may not reflect memory, concentration, or mood swing limitations)