Wilerms Oxygene v. Loretta Lynch
813 F.3d 541
4th Cir.2016Background
- Petitioner Wilerms Oxygene, a lawful permanent resident and Haitian refugee, was convicted in Virginia of aggravated felonies and firearm offenses; DHS initiated removal proceedings in 2011.
- Oxygene sought deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), alleging he would face indefinite detention, deplorable prison conditions, disease (latent tuberculosis), lack of medical care, and possible mistreatment amounting to torture if returned to Haiti.
- Administrative record included State Department country reports, NGO reports, and news documenting severe overcrowding, disease, poor hygiene, and incidents of abuse in Haitian prisons; ambiguity remained about whether Haiti maintained a blanket policy detaining criminal deportees.
- The Immigration Judge (IJ) and the BIA found prison conditions deplorable and that Oxygene might be detained, but concluded he failed to show it was "more likely than not" he would be tortured because he did not prove Haitian officials specifically intended to inflict severe pain or suffering.
- Oxygene also sought reopening based on recent PTSD and depression diagnoses and evidence of stigma toward mental illness in Haiti; the BIA denied reopening for lack of a showing that the new evidence would change the result.
- Because Oxygene is an aggravated-felony alien, this court’s review is limited to questions of law and constitutional claims; factual sufficiency and discretionary factual determinations are outside its jurisdiction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Proper mens rea for "intentionally inflicted" in CAT: whether knowledge to a near certainty suffices as "specific intent" to torture | Oxygene: Specific intent may be satisfied by deliberate detention coupled with near-certain knowledge that severe pain/suffering will result | Government: CAT (and BIA precedent In re J-E-) requires specific intent meaning purpose or desire to cause severe pain; mere knowledge is insufficient | Court: Accepts BIA's In re J-E- interpretation; specific intent requires desire/purpose to inflict severe pain (knowledge alone insufficient) |
| Whether IJ/BIA erred as a matter of law by following In re J-E- | Oxygene: In re J-E- misstates CAT intent standard | Government: In re J-E- correctly interprets CAT and implementing regulations | Held for Government; no legal error in applying In re J-E- |
| Whether substantial-evidence review of factual findings is available here | Oxygene: challenges application of intent standard to facts | Government: Jurisdiction limited because aggravated felony removes review of factual sufficiency | Court: Lacks jurisdiction to review factual-sufficiency challenge; can consider only legal question about intent standard |
| Whether BIA abused discretion in denying motion to reopen based on new mental-health evidence | Oxygene: Stigma against mental illness in Haiti makes him likelier to be singled out for torture; new evidence would change result | Government/BIA: New evidence insufficient to show likelihood of torture; factual determination | Court: Dismissed for lack of jurisdiction (factual determination) |
Key Cases Cited
- Saintha v. Mukasey, 516 F.3d 243 (4th Cir.) (limits judicial review where petitioner convicted of aggravated felony)
- Suarez-Valenzuela v. Holder, 714 F.3d 241 (4th Cir.) (standard of review for CAT denials)
- Cherichel v. Holder, 591 F.3d 1002 (8th Cir.) (discusses scope of review and CAT interpretation)
- INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415 (1999) (deference principles to agency interpretations in immigration context)
- United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394 (1980) (distinction between specific and general intent; specific intent akin to purpose)
- Villegas v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d 984 (9th Cir.) (defers to BIA’s In re J-E- reading of CAT intent)
- Pierre v. Gonzales, 502 F.3d 109 (2d Cir.) (affords deference to In re J-E- interpretation)
- Auguste v. Ridge, 395 F.3d 123 (3d Cir.) (applies Chevron/Auer deference to BIA interpretation)
- Cadet v. Bulger, 377 F.3d 1173 (11th Cir.) (supports In re J-E- interpretation)
- Elien v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 392 (1st Cir.) (adopts In re J-E- approach)
- Ridore v. Holder, 696 F.3d 907 (9th Cir.) (example where IJ inferred specific intent from a more developed record and granted CAT relief)
- United States v. Arthur, 544 F.2d 730 (4th Cir.) (permitting inference of intent from knowledge in criminal context)
- Neiswender, 590 F.2d 1269 (4th Cir.) (discusses inferential proof of intent)
- Soliman v. Gonzales, 419 F.3d 276 (4th Cir.) (distinguishes deference contexts when interpreting state criminal law)