Wilcox Industries Corp. v. Hansen
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63668
D.N.H.2012Background
- Wilcox manufactured the SCOUT/PATRIOT self-contained life-support device and is developing the next-generation PATRIOT.
- Hansen, a Wilcox employee from 2003–2007, later became President of ALST and consulted for Wilcox through 2009.
- During employment, Hansen had access to confidential information about Wilcox’s life-support technology and customers; NDA and related agreements protected secrecy.
- Hansen signed a Royalty Agreement assigning to Wilcox rights to patent/copyright-related to SCOUT and receiving royalties on net billings.
- Hansen and ALST allegedly used Wilcox trade secrets and confidential information to develop ALST’s SHIELD and solicited Wilcox customers, including serving as consultants while marketing competing products.
- Court granted in part and denied in part defendants’ motion to dismiss; NHUTSA preemption and pleading sufficiency were central to the resolution.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| NHUTSA preemption applies to non-competitive claims | Wilcox argues NHUTSA preempts only misappropriation claims, not independent torts. | Defendants contend NHUTSA preempts all non-contractual claims based on misappropriation or related conduct. | Some non-NHUTSA claims survive if independent of misappropriation facts. |
| Whether common-law and NHCPA unfair competition survive preemption | Wilcox asserts unfair competition via misappropriation, deceptive statements, and customer targeting. | NHUTSA preempts depending on misappropriation-based allegations; NHCPA requires in-state conduct. | NHUTSA preempts remaining unfair-competition theories; NHCPA claim dismissed for lack of in-state conduct. |
| Intentional interference with contractual relations—existing vs prospective | Wilcox pleads interference with customer relationships; seeks prospective and possibly existing-contract theories. | NH law requires either existing contract interference or, if only prospective, proper pleading of an economic relationship. | Claim viable only for intentional interference with prospective contractual relations; existing-contract theory lacking. |
| Breach of fiduciary duty and unjust enrichment preemption | Wilcox pleads breach of fiduciary duty and unjust enrichment based on misappropriation. | NHUTSA preempts claims grounded in misappropriation; asserted breaches lack independent basis. | Breach of fiduciary duty and unjust enrichment preempted by NHUTSA; not independent of misappropriation. |
| Sufficiency of misappropriation claim under NHUTSA | Wilcox identifies trade secrets and alleges misuse and knowledge through confidential relationships. | Complaint insufficient to plead trade secrets and improper acquisition. | Sufficiently pled; trade secrets exist, were misused, and knowledge obtained through improper means. |
| Breach of contract claim sufficiency against Hansen | Wilcox alleges NDA and Royalty Agreement breaches by disclosure and use of technology. | Plaintiff must plead valid contract and breach with adequate detail about disclosures. | Pleadings sufficient at this stage; contract existence and breach plausibly alleged. |
| Breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing | Wilcox asserts implied duty due to discretion in performance. | Implied duty not triggered where contract terms straightforward; no discretion alleged. | Dismissed; claim not plausibly alleging discretionary conduct within contracts. |
Key Cases Cited
- Mortgage Specialists, Inc. v. Davey, 153 N.H. 764, 904 A.2d 652 (2006) (NHUTSA preemption of other remedies for misappropriation)
- Lash v. Cheshire Cnty. Sav. Bank, Inc., 124 N.H. 435, 474 A.2d 980 (1984) (broad definition of fiduciary relationship)
- Centronics Corp. v. Genicom Corp., 132 N.H. 133, 562 A.2d 187 (1989) (implied good-faith limits in contract performance)
- Baker v. Dennis Brown Realty, Inc., 121 N.H. 640, 433 A.2d 1271 (1981) (economic relationship sufficiency for interference claims)
- Liberty Leather Corp. v. Callum, 653 F.2d 694 (1st Cir. 1981) (tortious interference may rest on defamatory remarks)
