Wilbert Walker v. State
2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 4424
| Tex. App. | 2015Background
- Appellant Wilbert Walker was indicted for possession of cocaine and alleged as an habitual offender; a jury convicted him and assessed 75 years’ imprisonment.
- During voir dire a potential juror (juror #4) stated she remembered Walker from about 20 years earlier and that he had been "in and out, you know, locked up," and had traded with her business; the court did not admonish the panel at that time.
- The prosecutor and defense counsel later conducted voir dire discussing burden of proof, presumption of innocence, and punishment; juror #4 was later excused for cause after challenges.
- At the punishment phase the State introduced evidence of an extraneous cocaine offense; defense objected only on chain-of-custody/authentication grounds (not on burden-of-proof for extraneous offenses).
- Walker moved to suppress evidence from a traffic stop; officer video showed a stop for unlit taillights, a pat-down with Walker’s apparent consent, and Walker handing over a cigarette box that the officer then inspected and found contraband. The trial court found the stop lawful and consent voluntary.
Issues
| Issue | Walker's Argument | State's/Trial Court's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Whether the venire should be quashed after juror #4’s comment about prior incarceration | Juror’s comment exposed the entire panel to Walker’s criminal history, denying an impartial jury | The comment was remote, juror #4 was excused, and no harm shown to the panel | Court affirmed: no abuse of discretion; Walker failed Callins harm showing |
| 2. Whether admission of cocaine from an extraneous offense at punishment was error | Evidence of extraneous offense was improperly admitted because State did not meet burden of proof | Defense failed to preserve complaint—objected only to chain of custody/authentication, not burden-of-proof | Court affirmed: issue forfeited for appeal under preservation rules |
| 3. Whether the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress the evidence from the traffic stop | Stop/search were constitutionally unreasonable; consent was involuntary | Stop lawful for traffic violation; consent to pat-down and inspection of cigarette box was voluntary | Court affirmed: trial court’s voluntariness finding was not clearly erroneous |
| 4. Whether admitting defense exhibit containing Walker’s criminal history during guilt phase was error | Inclusion of criminal history prejudiced guilt-innocence phase | Defense introduced the exhibit without limiting instruction or redaction, and did not request limitation timely | Court affirmed: failure to request limiting instruction at first opportunity waived complaint |
Key Cases Cited
- Mendoza v. State, 552 S.W.2d 444 (Tex. Crim. App.) (standard for reviewing denial of venire-quash motion)
- Callins v. State, 780 S.W.2d 176 (Tex. Crim. App.) (harm showing required when panel exposed to prejudicial remark)
- Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794 (U.S.) (no presumption of prejudice from juror exposure; jurors need not be totally ignorant)
- Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478 (U.S.) (presumption of innocence is fundamental)
- Meekins v. State, 340 S.W.3d 454 (Tex. Crim. App.) (standard for voluntariness of consent to search)
- Valtierra v. State, 310 S.W.3d 442 (Tex. Crim. App.) (state must prove voluntariness of consent by clear and convincing evidence)
- Schmutz v. State, 440 S.W.3d 29 (Tex. Crim. App.) (structural error doctrine and its narrow scope)
- Mozon v. State, 991 S.W.2d 841 (Tex. Crim. App.) (abuse-of-discretion review for admission of evidence)
- Hammock v. State, 46 S.W.3d 889 (Tex. Crim. App.) (requirement to request limiting instruction at first opportunity)
