632 F. App'x 661
2d Cir.2015Background
- Plaintiff Daniel J. Wik (pro se) owned seven properties foreclosed by the City of Rochester for unpaid taxes; he also alleged seizure of personal property by the City.
- Wik pursued state-court proceedings challenging the foreclosures; state judges denied relief and concluded he lacked ownership in most properties.
- After state-court actions concluded, Wik sued in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking return of real and personal property.
- The district court dismissed Wik’s real-property claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine and the Tax Injunction Act.
- The district court later dismissed Wik’s remaining personal-property claims for failure to prosecute after Wik declined to proceed to trial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether federal court could hear claims attacking state-court foreclosure judgments | Wik sought federal review and reversal of state foreclosure judgments and return of property | City argued federal court lacked jurisdiction under Rooker–Feldman (and Tax Injunction Act) because state judgments preceded the federal suit | Court held Rooker–Feldman bars Wik’s real-property claims; dismissal affirmed |
| Whether district court abused discretion in dismissing remaining personal-property claims for failure to prosecute | Wik argued merits or that trial would be futile; he also refused to comply with pretrial orders and declined to proceed | City relied on court rules permitting dismissal when plaintiff refuses to proceed or fails to comply with orders | Court held dismissal for failure to prosecute was within district court’s discretion and affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Rooker v. Fidelity Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) (federal courts lack jurisdiction to review state-court judgments)
- D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983) (Rooker–Feldman framework explained)
- Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005) (definitive statement of Rooker–Feldman scope)
- Green v. Mattingly, 585 F.3d 97 (2d Cir. 2009) (application of Rooker–Feldman in the Second Circuit)
- Lewis v. Rawson, 564 F.3d 569 (2d Cir. 2009) (standard of review for dismissals for failure to prosecute)
- Zagano v. Fordham Univ., 900 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1990) (district court may dismiss under Rule 41(b) when plaintiff refuses to proceed to trial)