Wightman v. Ohio Real Estate Commission, 961 N.E.2d 196

Wightman is a licensed real estate salesperson affiliated with Prudential in Columbus, involved in a 2006 duplex sale with the Meyerses.
The Meyerses listed and discussed selling 1173-1175 Oregon Ave. and considered converting to condominiums; Wightman advised on pricing and timing.
An Exclusive Right to Sell listing contract was signed, granting Prudential a 7% commission; a write-in provision potentially reducing commission if Ray bought quickly.
Wightman presented an offer to the Meyerses reflecting a plan to purchase, convert to condos, and resell for profit, with contentious terms emphasizing self-interest.
After counteroffers and lack of agreement, the Meyerses later sold the duplex as two condos; Wightman faced a Division complaint alleging he changed the represented party without written consent.
The Division and commission found Wightman violated R.C. 4735.59 as incorporated in R.C. 4735.18(A)(9); Wightman appealed, arguing lack of notice and no change in representation.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Did Wightman violate R.C. 4735.59 by changing representation?	Wightman: never represented another party; he ended representation to act for himself.	The state: Wightman changed the party represented from Meyerses to himself, triggering 4735.59 written-consent requirement.	Wightman did not change the represented party; 4735.59 does not apply.
Did the Division/commission have jurisdiction given timing delays under R.C. 4735.051(D)?	Delays in the investigator’s report were noncompliant, potentially stripping jurisdiction.	Delays are directory, not mandatory; no prejudice shown; jurisdiction preserved.	Commission had jurisdiction; noncompliance did not warrant reversal.
Is the sole assignment of error moot given the court’s ruling on the first assignment?	Third assignment of error concerns sufficiency of consent in writing.	Because the first assignment is sustained, the third is moot.	Third assignment moot.

Barlow v. Ohio Real Estate Comm., 10th Dist. No. 09AP-1050, 2010-Ohio-3842 (2010) (time provisions are directory; failure to act timely not jurisdictional)
Boggs v. Ohio Real Estate Comm., 186 Ohio App.3d 96, 2009-Ohio-6325, 926 N.E.2d 663 (2009) (timeliness and prejudice standard for agency investigations)
Royer v. Ohio Real Estate Comm., 131 Ohio App.3d 265, 722 N.E.2d 172 (1999) (interpreting shall in similar timing provisions; mandatory vs. directory)
Dorrian v. Scioto Conservancy Dist., 27 Ohio St.2d 102, 271 N.E.2d 834 (1971) (time-for-duty framework in official actions)
State ex rel. Webb v. Bryan City School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 10 Ohio St.3d 27, 460 N.E.2d 1121 (1984) (interpretation of time provisions in public duties)
State ex rel. Harrell v. Streetsboro City School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 46 Ohio St.3d 64, 544 N.E.2d 924 (1989) (statutory time interpretations in public actions)