Wiggins v. Kimberly-Clark Corp.
641 F. App'x 545
6th Cir.2016Background
- Wiggins, a Kimberly‑Clark employee, was reported by co‑worker Presley for allegedly smelling of alcohol after a team meeting; a breath test at the hospital read 0.00 and a subsequent urine drug test was negative.
- Pursuant to company protocol, Wiggins signed a consent-to-test form (he alleges under duress fearing job loss), was suspended pending results, then returned to work after negative tests.
- Wiggins filed suit alleging breach of contract (based on Kimberly‑Clark’s alcohol policy/Code of Conduct) and multiple torts against the company and unnamed Doe co‑workers; later he sought to amend to name Presley and Grizzle.
- The district court dismissed the contract claims (finding no enforceable contractual rights), denied leave to amend to add the named co‑workers (statute of limitations/Rule 15 relation‑back issues), and granted summary judgment on remaining tort claims as barred by Tennessee’s workers’ compensation exclusivity.
- The Sixth Circuit reviewed de novo and affirmed the district court judgments in all respects.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Kimberly‑Clark’s Code of Conduct/alcohol protocol created enforceable contractual rights | Code/protocol created enforceable promises and procedures binding the employer | Code disclaims contractual intent; protocol is a unilateral policy guide | No contract; disclaimer and guide language preclude enforceable rights |
| Whether leave to amend to name Presley and Grizzle should be allowed after limitations ran | Wiggins could identify the Doe defendants only after filing and should be allowed to relate back | Amendment is joinder of new parties; relation back fails because there was no "mistake" about identities and defendants lacked timely notice | Denied as futile and untimely; relation‑back requirements not met |
| Whether misrepresentation claim (the one not time‑barred) should proceed | Misrepresentation based on reliance on protocol statements | Protocol was created by employer; pleading of reliance and elements inadequate | Futilely pleaded; dismissal appropriate |
| Whether remaining tort claims against co‑workers survive despite being workplace injuries | Alleged intentional torts and other torts arising from workplace conduct | Tennessee workers’ compensation exclusivity bars recovery for work‑related injuries (absent employer‑intentional tort) | Summary judgment affirmed: tort claims barred by workers’ compensation exclusivity |
Key Cases Cited
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (pleading‑standard principles)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (pleading‑standard principles)
- Smith v. Morris, 778 S.W.2d 857 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988) (employer handbook/policy creates contract only with explicit intent)
- Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (standards for leave to amend)
- Cox v. Treadway, 75 F.3d 230 (6th Cir. 1996) (substituting named defendants for Doe is joinder of new parties)
- Miller v. Calhoun County, 408 F.3d 803 (6th Cir. 2005) (futility standard for amendment)
- Valencia v. Freeland & Lemm Constr. Co., 108 S.W.3d 239 (Tenn. 2003) (workers’ compensation exclusivity for workplace injuries)