410 P.3d 1205
Wyo.2018Background
- Defendant Misty Lynn Widdison stabbed her uncle, David Jones; convicted by jury of aggravated assault and attempted second-degree murder and sentenced to concurrent terms (25 years and 8–10 years).
- Widdison had lived with Jones off and on for ~5 years and used his address on her driver’s license; facts about whether she was a resident were contested at trial.
- At the scene officers found Jones bleeding with stab wounds; Widdison claimed Jones had threatened her, pinned her, and she wrestled a knife away; Jones claimed he told her to leave prior to the injury.
- Defense sought a "castle doctrine" (no duty to retreat in one’s residence) instruction and proffered testimony of specific violent incidents by Jones; the court refused the castle instruction (finding as fact she was a guest) and curtailed testimony about prior violent acts.
- The Wyoming Supreme Court held the trial court improperly resolved the factual question of residence (invading the jury’s fact‑finding role), reversed and remanded for retrial; it also found other instructional and evidentiary errors worth guidance on remand.
Issues
| Issue | Widdison's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the district court erred by rejecting a castle‑doctrine instruction based on the court’s factual finding that Widdison was a guest | Court should have submitted residence question to jury; castle doctrine applies to cohabitants | Widdison was a guest/trespasser after being asked to leave, so castle doctrine didn't apply | Court reversed: district court invaded jury’s fact‑finding; the residence issue must go to jury and refusal to give instruction was an abuse of discretion and prejudicial |
| Whether self‑defense instructions improperly presented two standards without specifying which applied to which charge | Jury needed clearer allocation of standards between attempted murder (deadly‑force standard) and aggravated assault (bodily‑harm standard) | Instructions were accurate and referenced the charges; jury likely understood application | No reversible error; instructions were accurate though clearer linking would be preferable on remand |
| Whether malice and recklessness instructions were erroneous (definitions and failure to define terms) | Instruction improperly conflated/alternated definitions of malice and omitted definitions for "recklessly" / "extreme indifference" | State conceded malice instruction violated clear law; argued definitions not required | Malice instruction was incorrect (violated Wilkerson); failure to define "recklessly"/"extreme indifference" not reversible per Schmuck and Wilkerson guidance |
| Whether the court abused discretion in excluding testimony of specific prior violent incidents by the victim | Prior specific‑instance testimony was admissible under W.R.E. 404(a)(2)/405(b) to show victim's violent character and first aggressor status | Court excluded it; State later conceded exclusion was erroneous but argued harmless | Exclusion was an abuse of discretion; admissible under Rule 405(b); prejudice not decided because case remanded on other grounds |
Key Cases Cited
- District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (Second Amendment protects possession of firearms for lawful purposes including self‑defense in the home)
- State v. Glowacki, 630 N.W.2d 392 (Minn. 2001) (adopting rule that cohabitants need not retreat in the home)
- Drennen v. State, 311 P.3d 116 (Wyo. 2013) (jury should be instructed on and determine which party was the aggressor when disputed)
- Haire v. State, 393 P.3d 1304 (Wyo. 2017) (no absolute duty to retreat; aggressor who provoked conflict must withdraw before claiming self‑defense)
- Wilkerson v. State, 336 P.3d 1188 (Wyo. 2014) (definition of "maliciously" for second‑degree murder requires recklessness manifesting extreme indifference to human life)
- Schmuck v. State, 406 P.3d 286 (Wyo. 2017) (court need not give separate definition of ordinary recklessness; heightened recklessness formulation suffices for second‑degree murder)
- Palmer v. State, 59 P. 793 (Wyo. 1900) (adopting the castle doctrine: a person assaulted in his home need not retreat)