Widdison v. Bd of Pardons, 489 P.3d 158

Bobbie Widdison was convicted of first-degree felony murder and sentenced to life (plus concurrent child‑abuse terms); the Utah Board of Pardons and Parole set a parole date of May 8, 2018.
The Board later held a rescission proceeding based on unadjudicated allegations (drug/alcohol provision and abuse of other children) and rescinded her parole date, effectively “expiring” her life sentence.
Widdison petitioned for extraordinary relief in district court, arguing state and federal constitutional violations and asking reinstatement of her original parole date; the district court granted summary judgment for the State.
While the appeal was pending, the Board paroled Widdison; she conceded mootness but asked the Supreme Court to hear the case under the public‑interest mootness exception.
The Utah Supreme Court held the appeal moot, agreed the issues are of public interest and likely to recur, but concluded Widdison failed to show the third element—likely to evade review—so it declined to reach the merits; an opinion concurring in judgment (A.C.J. Lee) agreed dismissal was appropriate but disagreed with the majority’s treatment of precedent on the mootness exception.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Mootness after parole	Widdison conceded parole but urged exception to permit review	State said parole mooted all requested relief	Case is moot; dismissal affirmed because Board paroled her and no exception applied
Public‑interest exception — affects public interest	Widdison: rescission on unadjudicated conduct implicates constitutional rights and systemic impact	State: moot; no showing exception elements met	Court: issue affects public interest and will likely recur, but exception fails on third prong
Public‑interest exception — likely to evade review	Widdison: Board strategically paroled her to avoid precedent; inmates lack resources, rescissions short‑lived	State: no evidence of systemic, strategic mooting or cognizable collateral consequences	Widdison failed to prove the issue is likely to evade review (no pattern/systematic proof; district‑court ruling and five years of process undermined claim)
Merits (parole rescission based on unadjudicated allegations)	Widdison: rescission violated due process and other constitutional rights; sought reinstatement	State: merits not reached on appeal because case moot; district court granted summary judgment	Court did not decide merits; summary judgment left in place because appeal dismissed as moot

Utah Transit Auth. v. Local 382 of Amalgamated Transit Union, 289 P.3d 582 (Utah 2012) (articulates three‑part public‑interest mootness exception and limits third prong to rapidly resolving issues)
State v. Steed, 357 P.3d 547 (Utah 2015) (clarifies third prong requires that an issue be likely, not merely capable, of evading review)
Teamsters Local 222 v. Utah Transit Auth., 424 P.3d 892 (Utah 2018) (explains voluntary‑cessation doctrine, defines the relevant controversy, and distinguishes plaintiffs’ and defendants’ voluntary acts)
McBride v. State Bar, 242 P.3d 769 (Utah 2010) (found bar‑exam disputes could evade review because of exam timing; discussed in debates over mootness doctrine)
Kearns‑Tribune Corp. v. Salt Lake Cnty. Comm’n, 28 P.3d 686 (Utah 2001) (applied mootness exception for closed‑meeting claims that would otherwise escape review)
Anderson v. Taylor, 149 P.3d 352 (Utah 2006) (recognized that certain claims could be moot before adjudication because of defendant actions, cited in mootness‑exception discussion)
InnoSys, Inc. v. Mercer, 364 P.3d 1013 (Utah 2015) (discusses voluntary cessation in Utah context)
State v. Legg, 417 P.3d 592 (Utah 2018) (on collateral consequences and mootness burdens)
Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1998) (rejected presumption that collateral consequences attach to parole‑revocation mootness)