Wholf v. Tremco, Inc., 2015 Ohio 171

Wholf worked in Tremco’s Online Information System (OLI) department (2006–2011) as OLI Sales/Customer Support Manager; he resigned May 20, 2011 and sued for retaliation and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Wholf reported sexual harassment by his manager, Nowak, after witnessing leering and alleged sexually suggestive comments (complaint to supervisors in March 2010 and to the company ethics NETWORK in June 2010). Tremco’s HR investigated and counseled Nowak; no further harassment was reported.
After complaining, Wholf alleges he suffered adverse actions: removal from projects, demotion of title (manager → coordinator), reassignment under a new supervisor (Sworney), new performance requirements, placement on a PIP, reduced bonus eligibility, and added duties leading to increased supervision.
Appellees moved for summary judgment; the trial court granted it, finding Wholf failed to show “but-for” causation for retaliation and that emotional-distress conduct was not extreme and outrageous. Wholf appealed only the retaliation ruling.
The appellate court applied McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting and the Supreme Court’s Nassar “but-for” causation rule for retaliation claims and reversed, holding Wholf produced sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case and that genuine issues of fact exist as to causation.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Applicable causation standard for R.C. 4112.02(I) retaliation claims	Wholf: Ohio law should use a less stringent "motivating factor" or pre-Nassar standard	Tremco: Nassar’s Title VII "but-for" causation applies; plaintiff must show retaliation would not have occurred but for protected activity	Court: Nassar’s "but-for" causation applies to Ohio R.C. 4112.02(I) (statutory language nearly identical to Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision)
Whether Wholf made a prima facie showing of retaliation	Wholf: produced evidence of protected activity, employer knowledge, adverse actions after complaints, and causal connection	Tremco: some adverse actions occurred before first complaint (recording), so no causation; alleged actions were legitimate reorganizational or performance-based decisions	Court: Wholf met the prima facie production burden under McDonnell Douglas; genuine factual disputes exist about causation and timing (reversed summary judgment)

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (framework for burden-shifting in discrimination cases) (establishes prima facie production burden)
Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (clarifies plaintiff’s prima facie burden is one of production, not persuasion)
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (discusses mixed-motives and motivator-standard where direct evidence exists)
Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (interpreting "because" as requiring but-for causation)
Univ. of Texas S.W. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (although cited in opinion by U.S. citation form, cited for the holding that retaliation claims require but-for causation)
St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (explains ultimate burden of persuasion remains with plaintiff after employer proffers nondiscriminatory reason)
Greer-Burger v. Temesi, 116 Ohio St.3d 324 (Ohio Supreme Court: federal Title VII jurisprudence generally applies to R.C. Chapter 4112)