Whittaker v. Mallott, 259 F. Supp. 3d 1024

Background

Jed Whittaker, an independent candidate for U.S. Senate in Alaska 2016, submitted a nominating petition that contained 2,081 signatures; Alaska required 2,854 (1% of prior election turnout), so his petition was rejected and he ran as a write-in.
Whittaker sued Lieutenant Governor Byron Mallott in his official capacity seeking an injunction to place his name on the ballot and a declaration that AS 15.25.160 (the 1% signature requirement) is unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
District Court screened and permitted the claim to proceed; defendant moved for summary judgment after being served; plaintiff filed a prior “summary judgment” motion that the Court treated as an improper attempt at default judgment and denied.
Mallott moved to dismiss on mootness and merits grounds; court found the case not moot under the capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review exception because Whittaker intends to run again and election timeframes are short.
On the merits, the court applied the Burdick balancing framework: determine the severity of the burden on ballot access and, if not severe, uphold the restriction if it advances important state interests and is reasonable in fit.
The court concluded Alaska’s scheme (1% signature requirement, open circulation by any qualified voter, indefinite collection period until primary date, and availability of write-in candidacy) imposes only a low burden and is justified by the State’s legitimate interest in regulating ballot size and preventing voter confusion; summary judgment for defendant granted.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Mootness	Whittaker sought relief removing the barrier generally; not moot because ongoing collateral effect	Mallott: 2016 election passed; specific relief for that election is moot	Not moot — capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review applies; Whittaker intends to run again and election windows are short
Standing / Relief sought (facial relief)	Challenges AS 15.25.160 as facially unconstitutional; seeks injunction against enforcement	State defends statute as constitutional and seeks dismissal on merits	Court considered facial challenge but resolved on merits: statute constitutional
Severity of burden from 1% signature rule	Whittaker: imposes substantial burden on low-resourced, rural, disabled voters; collecting signatures is onerous	Mallott: 1% is modest in absolute and relative terms; Alaska allows wide circulation, extended collection period, and write-in option	Burden held not severe — low burden when scheme considered as a whole
Constitutional review / fit of statute	Whittaker: restrictions unjustified and not narrowly tailored; argues precedent like Burdick is wrong	Mallott: statute advances important state interests (avoid confusion, manage ballot logistics) and fits those interests	Applying Burdick balancing, the statute survives because the State’s important interests justify the low burden

Key Cases Cited

Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992) (framework for evaluating burdens on ballot access; balancing test)
Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983) (early filing deadlines can burden independent candidates; balancing of interests)
Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968) (struck down overly restrictive party-formation rules; context for petition-signature restrictions)
Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974) (consider absolute number and timeframe when assessing petition burdens)
Am. Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974) (upheld larger signature thresholds where plaintiffs failed to prove restrictive effects)
Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971) (upheld petition requirements where circulation and signing were not unduly restricted)
Nader v. Cronin, 620 F.3d 1214 (9th Cir. 2010) (upheld 1% signature requirement in Hawaii and emphasized examining the full access scheme)
Ariz. Libertarian Party v. Reagan, 798 F.3d 723 (9th Cir. 2015) (election-related claims often fall within the capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review exception)