471 S.W.3d 670
Ark. Ct. App.2015Background
- Gregory Whitt was tried March 20, 2014, on charges of resisting arrest and endangering the welfare of a minor; during a recess he spoke to juror William Winkleman in a restroom, and juror Ashley Richardson overheard additional remarks.
- Winkleman reported that Whitt discussed the girlfriend taking medication and implied reasons for not telling authorities; Winkleman tried to change the subject and later informed the judge.
- The trial judge declared a mistrial, excused the jury, made an on-the-record finding that Whitt was in contempt “for the time being,” and ordered him into custody; no contempt hearing or written contempt order appears in the record.
- The State then charged Whitt with jury tampering under Ark. Code Ann. § 5-53-115; a jury convicted him on October 1, 2014, and he was sentenced to six years and a $5,000 fine.
- On appeal Whitt argued (1) double jeopardy barred the jury-tampering prosecution because he had been held in contempt for the same conduct, and (2) the evidence was insufficient to prove intent to influence a juror.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding no double-jeopardy bar because there was no evidence Whitt was punished for contempt, and that the evidence was sufficient to allow a jury to infer intent to influence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether prosecution for jury tampering was barred by double jeopardy because Whitt was previously held in contempt for the same conduct | Whitt: the contempt finding constituted punishment for the same conduct, making jury-tampering prosecution a second jeopardy | State: contempt finding was temporary; record shows no contempt hearing, order, or punishment, so no prior punishment for the same offense | Affirmed for State — no double jeopardy because there was no evidence Whitt was punished for contempt |
| Whether the evidence was sufficient to show intent to influence a juror as required for jury tampering | Whitt: his restroom conversation was initiated by juror, he may not have known the man was a juror, and his comments weren’t directly about charged offenses | State: Whitt admitted speaking to juror; his statements about girlfriend’s conduct related to events underlying the charges and could be seen as soliciting sympathy or influencing a juror; juror testimony supported inference of intent | Affirmed for State — viewing evidence in State’s favor, reasonable jurors could infer intent to influence |
Key Cases Cited
- Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932) (same-elements test for determining whether two statutes prohibit the same offense)
- Penn v. State, 73 Ark. App. 424 (2001) (contempt can be a lesser-included offense and may bar subsequent prosecution when punishment was imposed)
- Winkle v. State, 366 Ark. 318 (2006) (standard of review for double-jeopardy dismissal)
- Hughes v. State, 347 Ark. 696 (2002) (double-jeopardy protections and the three types of double-jeopardy bars)
- Walker v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 61 (2012) (application of same-elements test to determine distinct offenses)
- Hobbs v. State, 43 Ark. App. 149 (1993) (appellant must bring a record that demonstrates error)
