Whitney Bank v. Payne Lee & Associates Architects, LLC (JOINT ASSIGN)(MAG+)
2:14-cv-00969
M.D. Ala.Feb 10, 2015Background
- Whitney Bank sued Payne Lee & Associates Architects, LLC, David Payne, and Mark Lee for breach of a $250,000 promissory note (the Payne Lee loan) secured by collateral and guaranteed by Payne and Lee; bank says loan matured June 15, 2014 and defendants defaulted.
- David Payne asserted a counterclaim alleging breach of an oral agreement concerning a separate $750,000 loan (the Perry Monroe loan), claiming it was intended as a bridge loan and not to mature in one year.
- Plaintiff moved for summary judgment on its breach claim and to dismiss Payne’s counterclaim under Alabama’s Statute of Frauds for lack of a written modification/extension (filed Dec. 2014).
- The Magistrate Judge analyzed summary-judgment and Rule 12(b)(6) standards, hearsay admissibility at summary judgment, and Alabama Code § 8-9-2 controlling enforceability of agreements to modify loans or forbear repayment.
- The court found no written memorandum evidencing any extension or separate agreement and rejected defendants’ arguments about ambiguity or a separate oral contract; recommended granting plaintiff’s summary judgment and dismissing the counterclaim.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Payne Lee loan matured and defendants defaulted | Bank: note matured June 15, 2014 and defendants failed to pay → breach | Defendants: loan was orally extended, so no maturity/default | Court: no admissible written modification; summary judgment for Bank — note matured and defendants defaulted |
| Enforceability of an oral extension/forbearance under Alabama law | Bank: Statute of Frauds bars oral modification or forbearance absent a signed writing | Defendants: parties orally agreed to extend/modify term; separate oral contract or ambiguity avoids writing requirement | Court: Statute of Frauds (Ala. Code § 8-9-2) bars oral modification or separate oral loan commitment; no writing → unenforceable |
| Whether alleged oral agreement could be a separate contract escaping the Statute of Frauds | Bank: even a separate agreement to forbear or modify lending falls within the Statute and requires writing | Defendants: oral agreement was distinct and enforceable as separate contract | Court: § 8-9-2(7) expressly covers agreements to lend, delay, or forbear repayment; separate oral contract fails absent writing |
| Contract ambiguity argument to admit oral understanding | Bank: contract terms are clear and control; reasonable person standard governs interpretation | Defendants: subjective understanding that term was longer than written term | Court: objective reasonable-person standard controls; contract unambiguous as written; subjective belief insufficient |
Key Cases Cited
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (summary-judgment standard)
- Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (nonmoving-party burden at summary judgment)
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (summary-judgment procedures)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (plausibility standard at pleading stage)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (legal conclusions not entitled to pleading-stage deference)
- Jones v. UPS Ground Freight, 683 F.3d 1283 (hearsay at summary judgment)
- United States v. Dotson, 821 F.2d 1034 (analysis of hearsay-within-hearsay)
- Pendas–Martinez v. United States, 845 F.2d 938 (double-hearsay inadmissibility)
- Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (consequences of failing to object to magistrate recommendations)
