WHITNEY BANK, a Mississippi state v. Von Daniel Grant Jr., and Lisa D. Grant, 223 So. 3d 476

Grants executed two promissory notes (2005 and 2006) secured by mortgages on their single‑family residence; they defaulted (missed installments/balloon payment).
Peoples First Community Bank failed in 2009; FDIC as receiver assigned the notes to Hancock Bank (later became Whitney Bank).
In April 2012 Hancock approved a negotiated short sale of the property; sale proceeds left an estimated deficiency (~$99,377.70) and the bank reserved the right to pursue deficiency.
Whitney Bank (successor to Hancock) sent a default notice in November 2015; Plaintiffs did not cure.
In January 2015 Whitney Bank sued for breach of the two promissory notes seeking unpaid balances; Grants moved for summary judgment asserting the one‑year statute of limitations for deficiency actions (§95.11(5)(h)) bars the claims.
Trial court granted summary judgment for Grants; the district court reversed, holding §95.11(5)(h) does not apply and the five‑year written‑instrument statute (§95.11(2)(b)) governs.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the one‑year limitations rule for deficiency claims after foreclosure (§95.11(5)(h)) bars bank's suit for note deficiency following a short sale	§95.11(5)(h) governs deficiencies related to notes secured by residential mortgages and applies to short‑sale deficiencies; action is time‑barred	The bank's cause is a contract action on written instruments (notes), not a foreclosure/deficiency action under §95.11(5)(h); five‑year statute applies	§95.11(5)(h) does not apply because its triggering events (clerk's certificate of foreclosure or deed in lieu) did not occur; five‑year statute (§95.11(2)(b)) governs
When does the limitations period commence for deficiency claims after a short sale	Limitations accrues at short sale (per §702.06 measuring deficiency at sale date) so one‑year ran from 2012 short sale	Triggering events listed in §95.11(5)(h) are exclusive; absent those events the one‑year rule does not apply	Court rejects reading §95.11(5)(h) by reference to §702.06; plain text controls and neither triggering event happened, so §95.11(5)(h) is inapplicable

State v. Hackley, 95 So. 3d 92 (Fla. 2012) (statutory interpretation starts with plain, unambiguous language)
Overstreet v. State, 629 So. 2d 125 (Fla. 1993) (unambiguous statutory language is not subject to judicial construction)
Green v. Cottrell, 204 So. 3d 22 (Fla. 2016) (questions of statutory interpretation reviewed de novo)
Curd v. Mosaic Fertilizer, LLC, 39 So. 3d 1216 (Fla. 2010) (courts must look to plain language first in construing statutes)
Thayer v. State, 335 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 1976) (legislature’s word choices presumed to convey intended meaning)
State v. Burris, 875 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 2004) (courts cannot look behind clear statutory language to divine intent)