160 So. 3d 921
Fla. Dist. Ct. App.2015Background
- Lorraine Whiting executed a trust directing equal distributions to her three sons; amendments later gave Jeffrey a $153,000 early distribution with priority repayment to the others and, in 2010, a Second Amendment named Jeffrey sole residuary beneficiary.
- Concerns about Lorraine’s capacity in 2008 led to competing guardianship petitions by Anthony (emergency temporary guardian of property) and Jeffrey (plenary guardian of person and property). Attorneys represented all parties.
- The parties entered a Stipulation for Limited Guardianship and the court entered an Order Appointing Guardian upon Stipulated Limited Guardianship appointing a limited guardian and imposing a $1,500 cap on single financial transactions and a $1,500 per-person annual limit on gifts to blood relatives; the order contained no explicit finding of incapacity.
- The appointed guardian declined to serve, raising uncertainty whether the guardianship was intended as voluntary (which requires a physician’s certificate) or involuntary.
- After Lorraine’s 2011 death, Anthony sought to set aside the 2010 Second Amendment, arguing the Guardianship Order precluded Lorraine from amending the Trust; the trial court granted summary judgment for Anthony, set aside the Second Amendment, and restored equal distribution.
- The appellate court reversed, holding genuine issues of material fact exist about whether the Guardianship Order precluded Lorraine from amending the Trust and whether parol evidence may be considered.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Anthony) | Defendant's Argument (Jeffrey) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Guardianship Order barred Lorraine from amending the Trust | The $1,500 gift limit and other restrictions effectively removed Lorraine’s power to amend estate documents, so the Second Amendment is void | The Guardianship Order contains no express prohibition on amending the Trust; parties intended no limitation and parol evidence (attorney affidavits) shows that intent | Reversed: genuine factual disputes exist about the Order’s scope; summary judgment improper |
| Whether the Guardianship was voluntary or involuntary | Implied involuntary effect because of restrictions on transactions | Evidence (no judicial incapacity finding; lack of physician’s certificate) supports that it may have been voluntary and parties did not mean to limit testamentary powers | Court found ambiguity on voluntariness requiring extrinsic evidence; cannot decide on summary judgment |
| Whether parol evidence is barred by the written Stipulation | The Stipulation/Order are clear and unambiguous; parol evidence inadmissible | Latent ambiguity exists; extrinsic evidence is admissible to interpret parties’ intent | Court held parol evidence may be considered because latent ambiguities raise genuine factual issues |
| Proper standard on appeal for summary judgment and contract interpretation | N/A | N/A | Review is de novo; summary judgment reversed due to material factual disputes |
Key Cases Cited
- Gee v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 72 So.3d 211 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011) (standard of review for summary judgment)
- Polk v. Crittenden, 537 So.2d 156 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989) (parol evidence rule for complete, unambiguous agreements)
- Jenkins v. Eckerd Corp., 913 So.2d 43 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (latent ambiguity exception to parol evidence rule)
- GE Fanuc Intelligent Platforms Embedded v. Brijot Imaging Sys. Inc., 51 So.3d 1243 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011) (latent ambiguity arises when extrinsic facts reveal an insufficiency in the contract)
- Deni Assocs. of Fla., Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 711 So.2d 1135 (Fla. 1998) (discussion of latent ambiguities and extrinsic evidence)
- Bryan v. Century Park Nat’l Bank, 498 So.2d 868 (Fla. 1986) (distinguishing voluntary and involuntary guardianships and requirement of physician’s certification for voluntary guardianship)