Whitehurst v. 1199seiu United Healthcare Workers E., 928 F.3d 201

Background

Helen Whitehurst worked for Staten Island University Hospital (part of LIJHS) and was transferred to a new position in Sept 2014; she was treated as a 90‑day probationary employee in the new role.
In December 2014 she nodded off twice at work; her supervisor terminated her at the end of the 90‑day probation. She had a preexisting diagnosis of severe obstructive sleep apnea but did not disclose it until after termination.
Through counsel Whitehurst demanded the union (1199SEIU) file a grievance under the collective bargaining agreement (CBA); the union initially refused, filed a grievance only after an NLRB complaint, but declined to arbitrate, and the union’s internal appeals board denied review as unlikely to prevail.
Whitehurst sued in New York state court alleging disability discrimination under the NYSHRL and NYCHRL against the hospital defendants, supervisor, and the union; the union removed to federal court.
The District Court denied remand, concluding Whitehurst’s claims were completely preempted by § 301 of the LMRA and effectively constituted a hybrid § 301/duty of fair representation claim; the court dismissed the suit as time‑barred under the federal limitations period.
The Second Circuit affirmed, holding that adjudicating plaintiff’s claims necessarily requires interpreting the CBA and thus § 301 complete preemption applies.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether plaintiff’s state‑law discrimination claims are removable because § 301 completely preempts them	Whitehurst: claims arise under NYSHRL/NYCHRL and do not require interpreting the CBA; well‑pleaded complaint rule bars removal	Defendants: resolution of the post‑termination rights and union conduct depends on interpreting the CBA; § 301 completely preempts state claims	Held: preempted — § 301 applies because the claims are substantially dependent on interpreting the CBA
Whether the union’s refusal to arbitrate can be adjudicated without CBA interpretation	Whitehurst: alleged discriminatory refusal to pursue arbitration establishes NYSHRL/NYCHRL claims independent of CBA	Union: decision to arbitrate is discretionary and depends on reasonable interpretation of CBA and likelihood of success	Held: preempted — adjudication would require assessing the union’s interpretation and reliance on the CBA
Whether Figueroa v. Foster allows NYSHRL claims to avoid preemption here	Whitehurst: Figueroa shows NYSHRL is not necessarily preempted by federal labor law	Defendants: Figueroa addressed NLRA duty‑of‑fair‑representation conflict preemption, not § 301’s complete preemption	Held: Figueroa does not control; § 301 complete preemption is distinct and governs here
Whether the case was properly dismissed as untimely after removal	Whitehurst: did not contest timeliness if federal law applied	Defendants: federal six‑month limitations for hybrid § 301/DFR controls and claim is untimely	Held: dismissal proper — the federal limitations period applies and suit was untimely

Key Cases Cited

Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (federal question and complete preemption principles)
Allis‑Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (state claims substantially dependent on CBA are preempted)
Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (§ 301 promotes uniform interpretation of CBAs)
Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107 (state law rights independent of CBA avoid preemption)
White v. White Rose Food, 128 F.3d 110 (six‑month limitations for hybrid § 301/DFR claims)
Figueroa v. Foster, 864 F.3d 222 (NLRA duty of fair representation and conflict preemption of NYSHRL explained)
Vera v. Saks & Co., 335 F.3d 109 (review of remand denial on preemption grounds)
Sullivan v. American Airlines, Inc., 424 F.3d 267 (§ 301 among statutes with complete preemptive force)
Wynn v. AC Rochester, 273 F.3d 153 (distinguishing mere consultation of a CBA from interpretation)