White v. State
173 A.3d 78
| Del. | 2017Background
- On Sept. 24, 2012, Curtis White fired multiple rounds on a residential block; no one was injured and no rounds penetrated homes. Police recovered casings and related property damage.
- White was convicted by a jury of First Degree Reckless Endangering (felony), Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony, Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited, and related criminal mischief; sentenced to 19 years (12 years mandatory).
- At trial White asked counsel to request a lesser included offense instruction for Second Degree Reckless Endangering (misdemeanor); counsel declined, believing First Degree encompassed a risk of “serious physical injury” and thus no middle ground existed.
- In post-conviction proceedings counsel admitted he misunderstood the statutory elements and failed to research the distinction between risk of death (First Degree) and risk of physical injury (Second Degree).
- The Superior Court denied relief; the Delaware Supreme Court reviewed whether counsel’s failure was objectively unreasonable under Strickland and whether White was prejudiced by that failure.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (White) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether counsel’s refusal to request a lesser included offense instruction was objectively unreasonable under Strickland | Counsel unreasonably failed to request Second Degree instruction because he misunderstood the statutes and made no tactical choice | Counsel acted strategically to focus the jury on whether White created a substantial risk of death | Held: Unreasonable — counsel admitted legal ignorance and failed to perform basic research; decision was not a plausible tactical choice |
| Whether evidence supported giving a Second Degree Reckless Endangering instruction | The trial record (shots fired blindly, not aimed at particular persons, no injuries) gave a rational basis for a jury to convict of Second Degree instead of First Degree | State argued the instruction likely would not have been granted and that facts supported First Degree | Held: Evidence could reasonably support Second Degree; precedent permits lesser instruction depending on facts |
| Whether White suffered prejudice under Strickland from omission of the instruction | A reasonable probability exists that the jury would have convicted of misdemeanor Second Degree rather than felony First Degree if instructed | State contended prejudice was unlikely because instruction would not have been warranted | Held: Prejudice shown — reasonable probability of a different outcome exists |
| Remedy: What relief is appropriate if Strickland satisfied | White sought vacatur of First Degree conviction and new trial on those charges | State opposed relief or narrower remedy | Held: Convictions for First Degree Reckless Endangering and accompanying firearm felony vacated; new trial ordered on those charges |
Key Cases Cited
- Oney v. State, 397 A.2d 1374 (Del. 1979) (jury could rationally convict of lesser reckless-endangering offense where direction/target of shots was contested)
- Kauffman v. State, 452 A.2d 945 (Del. 1982) (trial court properly instructed jury on lesser included reckless-endangering offense despite firearm discharge)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-prong test for ineffective assistance of counsel: deficient performance and prejudice)
- Hinton v. Alabama, 134 S. Ct. 1081 (2014) (attorney’s fundamental legal ignorance combined with failure to research can constitute unreasonable performance)